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"Sunlight is the best disinfectant." - William 0. Douglas
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the scope of international legal commitments has expanded
to cover policy areas previously considered to be exclusive sovereign domains
of the State.I In tandem with expanding scope there has been a decisive shift of
authority and decision-making power to legal actors across many domains of
public international law-such as in public finance, human rights, investment,
and environmental regulation. 2 This transformation in scope and authority is
especially evident within the institutions that manage international economic
relations. 3 Today, international courts and tribunals routinely address topics
such as food safety standards, emissions rules, taxation, and other matters that
1. GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Inge
Kaul et al. eds., 1999). This expansion has spawned scholarship on how networks of public officials
have created new forms of sovereignty and order. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1998); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Judith
Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000); Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on International Law: The
State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012); Symposium on Global Administrative Law, 37 NYU J.
INT'L L. & POL. (Benedict Kingsbury & Richard Stewart eds., 2005).
2. See CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE RULES IN THE WTO
(2012); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, International Regimes fbr Human Rights, 15 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 265
(2012).
3. See DAVIS, supra note 2; Gary Bom, A New Generation ofInternational Adjudication, 61
DUKE L.J. 775 (2012).
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intrude deeply in national political affairs.4 The rise in authority of these bodies
has been so extensive that many legal scholars argue they play administrative
and constitutional roles that were previously reserved to national systems of
law and governance.
The intrusion of international law into national political affairs has raised
many theoretical and empirical questions for international legal studies. 6 Ques-
tions about transparency in the processes and outcomes of international dispute
settlement have been particularly important.7 For scholars, transparency has
been treated as a vital ingredient in enforcing treaties between nations-
because it helps to stabilize expectations, develop a notion of international "rule
of law" and lower transaction costs. However, transparency can also make
bargains and tradeoffs visible to interest groups that might oppose politically
inconvenient deals or commercial competitors who can obtain advantageous
information.9
4. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA, Case No.
2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009) (involving a dispute of billions of dollars
over an Ecuadorian court's decision for environmental damage compensation as a potential denial of fair
and equitable treatment). For food safety, see Appellate Body Reports, United States - Certain Country
of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted
July 23, 2012) (regarding the consistency of "Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods" with trade law).
5. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness ofInternational Adjudicators, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 464, 465 (Karen J. Alter, Cesare Romano & Yuval
Shany eds., 2014) (noting roles of international courts "include exercising constitutional, enforcement,
and administrative review" (footnote omitted)). On the role of dispute settlement, see Marc L. Busch &
Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GA777WTO Disputes, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 160 (2000) (arguing that "the success of the WTO system hangs on its ability
to encourage bargaining in the shadow of weak law"); William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Stand-
en, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations 35
YALE J INT'L L. 283, 284 (2010) (arguing that the international investment arbitrations now look far
beyond traditional issues of nationalization and expropriation to a "much broader variety of regulatory
and public goods").
6. See, e.g., INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff, and Mark A. Pollack, eds,
2013); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Hafner-Burton, Victor & Lupu, supra note 1; Gregory Shaffer
& Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012).
7. See generally Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS
(2005); TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013). For
WTO, see Ronald U. Mendoza, The Multilateral Trade Regime: A Global Public Good .for All?, in
PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION 455 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003);
Petros C. Mavroidis, Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO's View of Public Goods, 23
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 731 (2012). For the effort in international investment law, see James Harrison, Recent
Developments to Promote Transparency and Public Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 29
IOBSERVATEUR DES NATIONS UNIES 119, 120 (2010); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedur-
al Legitimacy ofInvestor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52
MCGILL L.J. 681, 684-85 (2007).
8. Todd Sandler, Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies, Efficiency and Institutions, in
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 20 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL
LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2007); Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Economic Foun-
dations of the Law of the Sea, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (2010); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones,
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002). For related research by
political scientists, see Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405 (2006).
9. David Stasavage, Open-door or Closed-door? Transparency in Domestic and Internation-
al Bargaining, 58 INT'L ORG. 667 (2004). On confidential business information, see Hans Smit, Confi-
dentiality in Arbitration, 11 ARB. INT'L 337 (1995). See also Yves L. Fortier, The Occasionally Unwar-
ranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB. INT'L 131 (1999).
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On balance, international legal scholars have viewed transparency as es-
sential to building broader public legitimacy, understanding and support for in-
ternational rules and legal institutions.10 With expanded scope and authority of
international law, scholars have argued even more vociferously for the public
benefits of greater transparency.II Yet while the public benefits from transpar-
ency become stronger, so do the private incentives for parties to keep inconven-
ient information secret.
Legal scholars have long debated the role of transparency-especially in
domestic institutions. Most notably, Owen Fiss in Against Settlement raised
alarms about the lack of transparency in legal procedures.12 For more than three
decades his argument-that settlements should be "neither encouraged nor
praised" because they sacrifice the public benefits of transparent adjudication at
the altar of private efficiency and conflict management-has been routinely de-
bated.' 3 Defenders of private settlement have pointed to the large benefits, es-
pecially for the parties who can use settlements to resolve disputes quietly and
without the audience costs that come with the public eye.1 4 By contrast, critics
warn that private settlement shields legal reasoning and substantive outcomes
from public scrutiny and debate, encourages corruption, undermines the legiti-
macy of legal processes, and impedes the formation and correct application of
legal precedent.1 5
In this Article, we suggest that the transformation in the scope and author-
ity of international economic law created a similar tension between public ben-
10. Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization ": Richer Views of
Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743 (2001); Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 699 (2000); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Sociali-
zation and International Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
11. Jutta Brunce & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an
International Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (2000); Harold H. Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); see also CHAYES & CHAYES,
supra note 1.
12. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlements "be
treated . .. as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets"). Fiss, of course, was not alone.
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668, 676-78 (1986); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 269, 281 (1988); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 138
(1983); Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experi-
ence, 38 HAST. L.J. 239, 249 (1986).
13. See Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution
and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate
Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769 (2005); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the
Public Realm, 83 GEO L.J. 2619 (1994); Jonathan Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era,
113 YALE L.J. 27, 35-36 (2003); James Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent:
Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986); Timothy Ter-
rell, Rights and Wrongs in the Rush to Repose: On the Jurisprudential Dangers of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 36 EMORY L.J. 541, 547-48 (1987); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
374 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Di-
vide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009).
15. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L.
REV. 973 (2008); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771
(2008); Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Against
Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2001).
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efits of a transparent legal order and the private incentives for efficient dispute
resolution. Yet the scholarship on international arbitration and dispute settle-
ment has not grappled with this new reality. International legal scholarship, in-
stead, has treated transparency as a free public good while largely ignoring the
precise incentives and mechanisms that determine the actual flow of relevant
information.' 6
We focus on investor-state arbitration-an area of international economic
law that, while important in its own right, is a bellwether for the conflict be-
tween private incentives for efficient dispute resolution and the public benefits
of transparency. Unlike most other processes under international law, investor-
state arbitration offers a formal mechanism for private actors to file claims
against states to seek compensation for alleged harmful conduct.' 7 Whereas
most disputes that implicate international law are initiated by nation states
themselves-who often choose to avoid disputes in the first place because their
other international priorities often require good diplomatic relations-the calcu-
lus for firms can be much narrower and more likely to prize private interests in
any particular dispute.' 8
Empirically, we examine the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID), the arm of the World Bank Group (WBG) that
handles investor-state disputes. It accounts for the largest share of known inter-
national investment arbitrations-roughly 70 percent-and also has the longest
history.' 9 The half-century of ICSID cases offers an opportunity for systematic
statistical analysis that is unavailable in other settings. 20 ICSID's rules allow us
to examine not just patterns of secrecy, but also the procedural mechanism by
16. See generally TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters
eds., 2013) (analyzing the concept of transparency in different fields of international law, yet failing to
provide any theory of how transparency can be achieved).
17. Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID's Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical
Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 465 (2013) (proposing an empirical research agenda to address, among
others, the value of ICSID adjudication).
18. See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a Greater Depoliticization ofInvestment Dis-
putes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21sT CENTURY 2, 23 (Kevin W. Lu, Gero Verheyen & Srilal M. Perera eds.,
2009) (introducing the concept of de-politicization to refer to the difference between the interests of
state and the investor in an investment dispute); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention:
Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009) (noting that some countries op-
posed the ICSID Convention because "it implied curtailment of the judicial branch's monopoly of the
administration of justice, and would grant foreign investors a legally privileged position"); Robert B.
Shanks, Lessons in the Management of Political Risk: Infrastructure Projects, in MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK 85, 93 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1998) ("The politically sensitive na-
ture of infrastructure projects [and] their relative vulnerability to government interference . . . heightens
the importance of... dispute resolution procedure.").
19. There is no reliable universe of arbitrations; thus this fraction is based on the most reliable
estimates from ICSID. ICSID Caseload- Statistics (Issue 2015-1), INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES (Jan. 31, 2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%2OWeb%20
Stats%202015-1%20(English)%20(2) Redacted.pdf.
20. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld & David G. Victor, Predictability
versus Flexibility: Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration, 68 WORLD POLITICS 1 (July 2016)
[hereinafter Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus Flexibility]; Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect?
Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 825 (2011); Sergio Puig,
Emergence & Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & Interna-
tional Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 531 (2013).
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which parties obtain secrecy-including settlement, which accounts for three-
quarters of all the cases whose substantive outcomes are not transparent. The
ICSID history also includes several policy reforms aimed at fostering transpar-
ency; statistically, it is now possible to observe whether those reforms are actu-
ally associated with the policy goal of opening arbitration to more public visi-
bility.
We build on our earlier work on ICSID and make three contributions.21
First, we claim that the rich history of debating settlement within national legal
systems is relevant to understanding analogous social costs and benefits of set-
tlement within international settings. Those contending theories of settlement,
rooted in theory as well as empirical research, suggest specific factors that
might explain patterns of settlement and when parties will seek secrecy in those
settlements. Our central contribution in this Article is to organize those litera-
tures and explanatory factors and to evaluate statistically whether international
analogues to those factors are associated with observed patterns of secrecy and
settlement at ICSID. While some of those factors are already discussed in the
literature,22 we offer additional factors more novel to the study of settlement
and secrecy-for example, the contention that certain kinds of firms that are
highly litigious might favor secret settlements because they use the highly pub-
lic act of filing suits to force favorable settlements but are extremely adverse to
letting poor cases run to completion.23 Based on the statistical data, we argue
that investor-state arbitration, and plausibly international economic law more
generally, now faces a 'Fissian' moment. The strategic uses of secrecy in arbi-
tration-notably through the mechanism of settlement-is running contrary to
the public benefits of more transparency around a legal system that has broader
scope and authority.
Second, we offer detailed case studies as examples of how the tendencies
that are observed statistically may play out in real world settings. Our three
cases help reveal how highly litigious claimants use the filing of claims to ob-
tain favorable settlements while also possibly manipulating precedent by using
settlement to keep legal reasoning and other important information secret.
These cases also reveal the intense private interest in secrecy for parties that
face other types of legal jeopardy, such as extraterritorial application of corrup-
tion laws, and may suffer political and commercial losses from transparency.
. Third, we outline policy reforms that could rectify many of the problems
created by secrecy at ICSID, especially, and investor-state arbitration more
generally.24 Our earlier statistical work has suggested that existing reforms
21. Id. See Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus Flexibility, supra note 20, for the first
presentation of the dataset at the core of this Article. For a preliminary application to legal questions
surrounding the efficacy of transparency-oriented reforms at ICSID, see Emilie Hafner-Burton & David
G. Victor, Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. OF INT'L
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 161 (2016) [hereinafter Hafner-Burton & Victor, Secrecy in International In-
vestment Arbitration].
22. Id.; see also Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus Flexibility, supra note 20.
23. See discussion infra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
24. For related public law treatments of investor-state arbitration, see Stephan Schill, Enhanc-
ing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L. L. 58 (2011-2012); Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali
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have not been followed by a noticeable rise in transparency, 25 but did not look
at policies that might actually work to promote transparency. Our central policy
argument here is the need to focus on settlement, which has become the central
means by which disputing parties keep their proceedings and outcomes se-
cret-exactly what Fiss warned against three decades earlier. To date, reform-
ers have focused on procedural issues mainly for cases that run to full comple-
tion with final awards. That approach, while instructive, has largely ignored the
underlying incentives motivating the preference for secrecy, and parties have
preserved many ways to keep inconvenient information away from the public
eye-settlement foremost among them. 26 Halting settlements is neither feasible
nor socially optimal.27 Instead, we argue for reforms that would set a much
higher floor for mandatory disclosure of settlement information and would nar-
row the allowable sequester information such as for information related to con-
fidential business practices or sovereign prerogative. Mindful that our argu-
ments have application to the efficient uses of settlement and secrecy in other
2829 30areas of international law such as trade,2 8 public finance, and tax, we look
not just at desired outcomes but also the practical processes through which
these reforms could be adopted. Ideal reforms that require changes to the
ICSID Convention will be difficult to implement. But sympathetic countries
can make productive efforts to experiment with new transparency and settle-
ment reforms by adding them to bilateral investment treaties, investment chap-
ters of trade agreements and other instruments that refer disputes to ICSID or
similar institutions.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I looks at why secrecy matters: why
it is often branded as a harmful outcome of settlements in national legal sys-
tems and why similar concerns are now rising in international law. Part II looks
into the literature on secrecy and organizes it around the four main factors that
scholars have offered as explanations for secret settlements. It then suggests
how those factors might apply within international legal systems, where the
same tensions arise between public goods linked to transparency and private
incentives for secrecy. Part III shifts to ICSID, detailing the background and
institutional procedures crucial to understanding how the incentives for secrecy
and settlement manifest within investor-state arbitration. Part IV introduces our
dataset and offers statistical models to explore the conditions associated with
Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J.
INT'L. & COMP. L. 337, 339 (2009).
25. See Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus Flexibility, supra note 20; see also Hafner-
Burton & Victor, Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration, supra note 21.
26. See discussion infra Section III.B.
27. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
28. Wolfgang Alschner, Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a Mul-
tilateral System, 13 WORLD TRADE REv. 65 (2014).
29. See, e.g., Inka Hanefeld, Arbitration In Banking and Finance, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 917,
2013 (discussing the increasingly importance of arbitration in banking and public finance).
30. See, e.g., Itai Grinberg & Joost Pauwelyn, The Emergence ofa New International Tax Re-
gime: The OECD's Package on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 28,
2015), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/24/emergence-new-intemational-tax-regime-
oecd's-package-base-erosion-and (suggesting that twenty countries committed to provide for mandatory
binding arbitration in their bilateral tax treaties).
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secrecy and settlement. Part V complements the analysis with three case studies
to further explore the incentives for secrecy and settlement and their effects
within the international legal system. Before concluding, Part VI proposes sev-
eral reform alternatives.
I. TRANSPARENCY AND THE PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF SECRET SETTLEMENT
Why is secrecy a problem? An answer to that question has emerged over
several decades of scholarship focused on the potentially harmful impacts of
settlements within the United States and other national legal systems. 31 Here
we first review answers to that question from the literature and then explain
how a similar debate is now poised to unfold within international law.
A. Effects of Settlement: Private Gains and Public Externalities
For the parties in a proceeding, the benefits of settlement may be clear
enough: to save themselves the costs and risks of trial and a potentially unfa-
vorable ruling. In some contexts, settlement may also prevent permanent rup-
ture of a relationship or help to maintain privacy.32
Private benefits from settlement may come, however, with large social
costs. 33 In employment discrimination cases, for example, one commentator
has argued that "[b]ecause of invisible settlements, no one knows-or has the
capacity to determine-what really is going on with employment discrimina-
tion litigation." 34 The private interests for settlement may clash with the public
good and welfare of a fully functioning judiciary. 35
Most arguments against settlement are rooted in a dichotomy familiar to
legal scholars: whether law is simply a mechanism to help litigants efficiently
manage conflicts and interpret and apply rules, or whether law serves a broader
objective that gives society a stake in observing and debating the outcomes of
disputes.36 When framed that way, legal scholarship has overwhelmingly fa-
vored a public role, especially in disputes and legal actions that implicate the
31. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1718-25 (2012) (discussing various factors contributing to the decline of civil trials in the United States,
among them settlement).
32. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Mo-
tive to Use the Legal System, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).
33. See Fiss, supra note 12.
34. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 961
(2006); see also id. at 930 ("[Ilnvisible settlements hamper lawyers' efforts to evaluate cases, counsel
clients, and negotiate effectively on clients' behalf.").
35. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 32, at 605 ("In some cases, the parties' desire for privacy
may be socially beneficial, but many times it seems that society would benefit from the information that
would be revealed through trial.").
36. For traditional legal literature on the question of the private versus the social motive to
settle, see for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 19; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Luban, supra note 13; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
[Vol. 42:2286
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authority and behavior of the government. 37 To be sure, settlement may also
result in societal benefits, such as efficient allocation of judicial resources. 38
However, most of the academic probing around the social impacts of settlement
has focused on the pernicious impacts of settlement on the public nature of le-
gal institutions. 39
Three broader effects of settlement on public welfare are commonly
claimed-each of which suggests that settlement should be curtailed or, at
least, subjected to rigorous oversight. First, settlement might affect the ability
of legal systems to develop accurate, persuasive, and coherent precedent.4 0 Set-
tlements, some argue, can lead both parties to accept outcomes that are not
aligned with the normative foundation or the consistent interpretation of the
law.41 The lack of consistency between cases that end in settlement and those
42that are fully litigated, in turn, will harm public welfare. Settlement, in effect,
may distort precedent and weaken the utility of adjudication as a "regulatory"
tool. 43 And by allowing parties to shield inconvenient information from the
public eye, settlement might even allow parties to manipulate precedent and the
reasoning available to courts.4
Second, settlements might undermine the ability of courts to deter unde-
sirable action such as abuse of power by public officials. 45 Where secret set-
tlements are available, the application of some sanctions might go unnoticed by
37. But see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements
and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 109 (1988) (addressing the social desirability of parties' decision to
settle).
38. For a classic study, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); see also Kathryn E. Spier, "Tied to the
Mast": Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 91 (2003)
("[A]voiding delayed settlement is privately and socially desirable .... ).
39. Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice ofLaw: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. I (1993).
40. On the social value of accuracy in adjudication, see Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy
in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 307 (1994); see also Fiss, supra note 12.
41. See, e.g., Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 327 (2006).
42. Shavell, supra note 32, at 605 ("This would be the situation with regard to the firm that
wants to keep its product defect secret: if the public learns about the defect, perhaps people can take pre-
cautions to reduce harm and, further, the firm will suffer adverse consequences, leading to improved
deterrence.").
43. Id. Extensions of this line of argument include a focus on how repeat players, such as
powerful corporations, can play for precedent by privately settling cases that might create inconvenient
precedents. See generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settle-
ment, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471
(1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Set-
tlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
44. Fiss, supra note 12, at 3; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 95 (1974). For a different perspective, see Robert
D. Friedman, Confusing the Means for the Ends: How a Pro-Settlement Policy Risks Undermining the
Aims of Title VII, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2013); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 109 (1988); Shavell, supra note
32; Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
84(1994).
45. Luban, supra note 13, at 2658-59 (contending that prohibiting secrecy enables settlements
"to fulfill at least some of the public values of adjudication").
2017] 287
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the broader public 46-in effect, insulating public officials (or other actors)
against charges of corruption, collusion, misconduct, and arbitrariness.
Third, because settlements are designed to offer quiet halts to adjudica-
tion, they might impede public debate about the legitimacy and precise content
of legal rules. At its core, this concern recognizes that a distinct function of le-
gal proceedings is to help structure public debate about ideas, public norms,
and societal values.47 Visible legal outcomes, perhaps especially when they
conflict with established social norms, can inspire public debate about needed
reforms in policy-leading politicians to adopt new legislation, courts to alter
their interpretation of existing statutes, or agencies to change their behavior.
Settlements can have a disrupting effect on such recursive processes.
All three of these concerns-on the erosion of precedent, on deterrence,
and on public debate-have led to proposals for reforms, including implemen-
tation of notice and comment procedures on settlement proposals, 48 require-
ments for approval by a judge prior to settlement, 49 authorization by a judge
prior to vacating judgments after settlement,50 or even the adoption of ethical
guidelines for lawyers involved in the settlement of mass claims.51 These ex-
amples of rules that support access to information of settlement agreements
recognize-at least in the domestic context-that public knowledge is prefera-
ble. They also help monitor performance of the judicial system and other gov-
ernmental officials; promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
system; provide an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion; and
can promote benefits that are specific to particular industries, such as reduced
incidence of defective and harmful products.52
To be sure, a number of competing policies support confidentiality of cer-
tain settlement agreements and judicial records from public view in the domes-
tic context. Among the most important of these concerns are the need to protect
privacy, commercial information, and the identity of informants. There is a
long history of addressing such concerns within national legal systems, such as
through the redaction of portions of settlement agreements. Policy makers and
academics have devoted considerable attention, as well, to topics such as
whether the transparency of settlements affects the incidence of "nuisance
claims," by free riders or for harassment purposes. 53 Overall, in the domestic
46. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631; see also Varda Bondy & Maurice Sunkin, Settlement in Judicial Review Proceedings,
PUB. L. 237 (2009).
47. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 13.
48. Advisory Comm. On Rules of Civ. Proc., Jud. Conf. of U.S., Minutes: Civil Rules Adviso-
ry Committee 2 (Apr. 2001).
49. See JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES
(1998); Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 232, 233 (2008).
50. See Resnik, supra note 43.
51. See ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (AM. BAR ASS'N 2002). The
Guidelines are based on the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 1.
52. See, for example, Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG.
889, 911-22 (2012) for a review of the literature and case law.
53. Id. at 922-27; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philo-
sophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2695 (1995); Ar-
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context, the assessment and balancing of policy goals for and against secrecy
has led to something akin to a presumption for the openness of settlements.
And in cases where openness is costly, oversight of settlements has been a pre-
ferred outcome. 54
B. Rising Concern About Transparency in International Law
A similar debate over whether legal institutions are merely a means to set-
tle disputes or whether they offer a larger public legal order has been playing
out at the international level for two closely related reasons.
One is the expanding scope and impact of international law, a trend that is
evident in areas including human rights55 and foreign direct investment," into
the social and economic domains of law. It is especially evident in the realm of
international economic law-the public international law applicable to interna-
tional trade, investment, taxation, finance, and intellectual property.
Consider, for instance, the controversial proceedings recently brought by
Philip Morris against Uruguay and Australia challenging domestic legislations
on marketing of tobacco products as an inappropriate expropriation of Philip
Morris's trademarks and goodwill. 57 Freedom to regulate marketing, and to set
health and safety standards, has long been an area of sovereign prerogative-
one that these types of cases could constrain.
Such concerns about the intrusion of international legal standards-and
thus international dispute settlement-into areas of national prerogative are not
new. Similar anxieties have been raised since the late 1990s. In a case heard by
an ICSID tribunal under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
that concerned Mexico's denial of a permit to construct a facility for the dis-
posal of hazardous waste (Metalclad)58 the issue of transparency gained popu-
lar awareness. 59 That case fanned fears that the investor-state arbitration tribu-
thur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV.
427, 480-82 (1991).
54. See Wasserman, supra note 52; see also United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo 11), 71 F.3d
1044, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing privacy concerns against a presumption of access).
55. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTS
BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY
(2013); Emilie M. Hafier-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influ-
ence Government Repression, 59 INT'L ORG. 593 (2005).
56. Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Policy Implications ofInvestor-state Arbitration Under
NAFTA Chapter 11, 7 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 171 (2007).
57. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, Case No. 2012-12, Philip
Morris Asia Notice of Arbitration, % 7.15-7.17 (Nov. 21, 2012); Philip Morris Brand Sirl v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010).
58. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M.
36, 48-49 (2001) [hereinafter Metalcladj (finding a denial ofa constnction permit for a hazardous waste
landfill on the basis of environmental concerns to be a breach of NAFTA provisions).
59. See generally Margrete Stevens, Confidentiality Revisited, NEWS FROM ICSID, Spring
2000, at 1; Anthony De Palma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but
Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/
nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html (citing an activist
declaring that ISDS was a "secret" form of governance); Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11,
NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION (July 31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/
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nal-which ruled in favor of the investor-was insensitive to the public interest
and was supplanting national prerogatives on important topics, such as envi-
ronmental policy. This contributed to an early backlash against investor-state
60
arbitration.
Second is the growing importance of judges and arbitrators in interna-
tional law, performing a wide array of functions in order to clarify rights and
obligations.61 With increasing complexity and professionalization of interna-
tional law have come more delegation to professional adjudicators and other
legal experts. The increased ability of courts, tribunals, and other legal bodies
to adjudicate state respect for international law is producing the judicialization
of international politics-that is, "the process by which courts and judges come
to make or increasingly to dominate the making of public policies that had pre-
viously been made (or, it is widely believed, ought to be made) by other gov-
ernmental agencies, especially legislatures and executives."62 This process in-
volves "a profound shift in power away from legislatures and toward courts and
other legal institutions around the world.",63
This judicialization of international law resonates with what some schol-
ars call "global administrative law"-a shift in the role of international legal
institutions that empowers certain legal actors. International treaties and the
resulting institutions empower bureaucrats and networks of national technocra-
cies to make decisions with reference to treaty rules and interpretations, or
standard-setting bodies.65 Scholars who have examined these institutions have
identified a wide array of implementation review mechanisms 66 and compli-
ance procedures67 that encourage experimentation and then create governing
CH11 understanding-e.asp (clarifying that "nothing in the NAFTA" imposes a general duty of confiden-
tiality precluding the parties from providing public access to documents submitted to or issued by a
Chapter Eleven Tribunal, "apart from the limited specific exceptions set forth expressly in the relevant
arbitral rules").
60. Antonio Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Invest-
ment Treaties, 16 ICSID REV. 20, 23 (2001) (referring to concerns of "entrusting [the application of
treaty standards] to investor-to-state arbitration" by NGOs).
61. Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT'L ORG. 563, 566 (2010) (explaining
the role of judicial lawmaking as one involving the clarification of substantive obligations).
62. C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 27,28 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
63. John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41
(2002).
64. Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 995, 995
(2005).
65. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Daniel C. Esty, Good Govern-
ance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Benedict
Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005); Ming-Sung Kuo, Taming Governance with Legality? Critical Reflec-
tions Upon Global Administrative Law as Small-C Global Constitutionalism, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 55 (2011).
66. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 57-88 (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff
eds., 1998).
67. Cesare Romano, INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, THE ILO SYSTEM OF
SUPERVISION AND COMPLIANCE CONTROL: A REVIEW AND LESSONS FOR MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (1996); David G. Victor, The Operation and Effectiveness of the Mon-
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systems through groups of experts who evaluate what works (and not). 68 Some
argue this reflects that international law is shifting from ex-ante law codified in
detail in treaties to ex-post law that relies on elaboration and interpretation by
dispute settlement bodies and other institutions that are empowered to interpret
vague terms and make material decisions. 69
The expanded scope and influence of international law has made trans-
parency in the operations of these international dispute settlement institutions a
much more important topic. 70 For decades, much of the research by interna-
tional legal scholars has focused on how legal agreements and procedures can
affect the political relations between states-reducing transaction costs, en-
hancing the shadow of the future so that reciprocity is easier to implement, and
stabilizing norms and expectations. 7 ' In that context, transparency has been
seen as vitally important to the process of forming reputations and expectations
that can allow states to build credibility and accountability. 72 It also exerts a
civilizing force on public discourse, encouraging actors to focus their argu-
ments to a greater degree on shared values and public interests rather than on
narrower interests or self-advantage, which in turn could lead to greater coop-
eration in a wide array of areas.73 It facilitates deliberation that can lead to
greater legitimacy and impact compliance with legal rules. 74 Many scholars
working at the intersection of international law and international relations see
treal Protocol's Non-Compliance Procedure, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 137 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
68. Grainne De Burca, Robert 0. Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, Global Experimentalist Gov-
ernance, 44 BRIT. J. POL. SC. 477 (2014); Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Prob-
lems Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-up Climate Policy Work, CLIMATIC CHANGE (2015).
69. INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters
eds., 2012); see also Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become
Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733 (2014).
70. For an analysis of the recent evolution of the topic in international economic law, see Carl-
Sebastian Zoellner, Transparency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in International
Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 579 (2006). For a more general perspective, see J. M. Goldgeier &
P.E. Tetlock, Psychology and International Relations Theory, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 67, 78 (2001) (not-
ing that transparency is especially relevant in settings "where the expert community is deeply divided
and there is ample opportunity for cognitive and emotional biases to taint evaluations of evidence and
options").
71. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of In-
ternational Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 504-05 (1985); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern Inter-
national Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
72. See Finnemore & Toope, supra note 10 (arguing that the role of international law in poli-
tics requires attention to the legitimacy of law, to custom and law's congruence with social practice, to
the role of legal rationality, and to adherence to legal processes, including participation in law's con-
struction). For an alternative view, see Michael Gilligan, Leslie Johns & B. Peter Rosendorff, Strength-
ening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 5 (2010) (argu-
ing that attempts to strengthen international courts must be accompanied by increased precision in
international law in order to ameliorate the use of asymmetric information).
73. See JUTTA BRUNNtE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 350-57 (2010).
74. Koh, supra note 11, at 2637 (referring to "instruments of active management," such as
"transparency, reporting and data collection, verification and monitoring, dispute settlement, capacity-
building, and strategic review and assessment" as elements of managing compliance).
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the power of international law coming from similar legitimizing, deliberative
75
processes.
Given the attention to the impacts and operation of international law,
along with increased delegation to adjudicatory institutions, it is surprising that
international legal scholars have not focused much on the proper role of settle-
ments. Scholars have largely ignored the causes and consequences of settle-
ments in international dispute settlement. 76 This dearth of reflection is partly
the result of a lingering vision of international law as a tool of intergovernmen-
tal diplomacy, a vision that views dispute settlement as a consensual process
biased towards negotiated outcomes that reflect state interests and comity. 7 In
fact, many international law scholars take the default normative position that
settlements are superior forms of outputs.78 By that logic, it is the amicable res-
olution of disputes, rather than the transparency of the content, that matters.
Other scholars looked to the root causes for legal outcomes, such as the role of
state power, and worried less about the visibility of the process. 7 They debated
questions including whether powerful countries could reject outright inconven-
ient rulings from international courts rather than try to hide them through set-
tlement.
The absence of academic work on these settlements also reflects the pau-
city of empirical information about its practice. Traditionally, parties in most
international disputes do not have to disclose all outcomes. While international
courts are often obliged to make their judgments public, the parties to proceed-
ings rarely have the duty to disclose the terms of settlements. Generally, inter-
national law leaves ample leeway to states not to make settlements public.
Absent information, there has been a thin theoretical debate about transparency.
And despite the "empirical turn" that is having such a large impact on improv-
75. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (ar-
guing that precision and transparency increase the legitimacy of rules and normative pull); see also
JUTTA BRUNNtE, MEINHARD DOELLE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, PROMOTING COMPLIANCE IN AN
EVOLVING CLIMATE REGIME (2012); CHAYES & CHAYES supra note 1; Finnemore & Toope, supra note
10.
76. Cf Wolfgang Alschner, Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a
Multilateral System, 13 WORLD TRADE REv. 65 (2014) (arguing against non-transparent settlements in
the WTO that affect Most Favorable Nation treatment). One of the few areas where scholars have
probed the incentives for secrecy and settlement is the GATT/WTO system. Busch & Reinhardt, supra
note 5.
77. In fact, when this logic was applied to fields such as investor-state arbitration the incen-
tives to allow secrecy only grew because private parties, it was assumed, would often want to keep
commercial dealings from the public eye.
78. W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
International Arbitration and International Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 358 (1996) (ques-
tioning the social value of international adjudication).
79. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory ofEffective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
80. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2003); Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept ofLegali-
zation, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000). See generally THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS:
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
81. In cases involving violations of international human rights court decisions have mandated
the dissemination of the judgment with the hope of deterring repetition. See Case of Vera Vera v. Ecua-
dor, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 226 (May 19, 2011).
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ing the quality of international legal scholarship, essentially all the focus of
new empirical work has been on different topics.82
As areas such as trade, investment, tax or finance, move into addressing
the relationship between public bodies and private entities (and not solely as a
tool for intergovernmental diplomacy), understanding the role of settlement be-
comes more relevant. One purpose of this Article is to address this gap and use
new available empirical data to start looking into the practice of settlement and
its potential costs.
II. EVER SINCE FiSS: EXPLAINING SECRET SETTLEMENTS
The scholarly literature since Fiss suggests that secrecy in judicial out-
comes-through settlement in particular-could be deeply problematic for the
legitimacy and functioning of a legal order. 83 For scholars of international law
who have not yet begun to grapple with the causes and consequences of settle-
ments, the extensive debate within national legal systems offers a very useful
starting point.
In this Part, we aim to build a testable set of hypotheses about when and
why parties seek both secrecy and settlements. First, we review the debate over
these questions in national legal systems and identify the variables that scholars
think explain patterns of settlement and secrecy. We adopt this approach be-
cause the domestic law literature on settlements can be used to frame hypothe-
ses that we can test empirically at the international level. Second, we offer a
simple matrix that helps to place this literature into a single conceptual frame-
work. We then apply that framework to the international level in the form of
hypotheses that we can evaluate empirically using the experience at ICSID.
A. Explaining Settlement: The National Legal Systems Literature
The literature on settlement is vast and difficult to categorize. Here, we
focus on studies that might explain why parties settle and when those settle-
ments will be kept secret. From that perspective, the literature has broadly con-
sidered four factors that affect decisions to settle: (1) the rules for disclosure;
(2) the asymmetries in information and bargaining power; (3) the desire for
avoiding audience costs; and (4) the opportunity for litigious parties to use set-
tlements for strategic reasons.
The first of these factors looks at the most fundamental constraint and of-
ten the easiest for policy makers to manipulate-the rules. The other three fac-
tors reflect the underlying incentives for secrecy and settlement. Much of the
law and economics literature-where formal theory and empirical tests related
to settlement have been most refined-views settlement through the lens of a
82. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. . INT'L L. 1 (2012).
83. See Laurie K. Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pur-
suit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Set-
tle': Judicial Promotion and Regulation ofSettlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1350-84 (1994). But see
Samuel Issacharoff& Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value ofSettlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1177
(2009).
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bargaining problem under the shadow of the law in which parties differ in their
information and power.84 That literature helps build a foundation for under-
standing when and why parties might settle.
1. Rules for Disclosure
Legal scholars, especially those working in the domain of law and eco-
nomics, have sought to unpack the incentives that explain why parties settle
cases rather than pursue a final ruling. In recent years, scholars have broad-
ened their attention to examine institutional, psychological, and sociological
factors that affect decision-making-and along the way, that broader attention
has looked at how such factors affect behavior related to litigation.
Some scholars, working mostly in theory, have focused on how different
legal rules influence litigants' decisions to settle.87 Empirical research has fol-
lowed and tested the important insights developed by theory.88 Three rules, in
particular, have attracted most attention: attorney's fees;89 procedural rules; 90
84. See infra Sections II.A.i-iv.
85. For a review of the literature, see Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation and Settle-
ment, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
86. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES
158-66 (1991); John J. Donohue, III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Ob-
servations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 202-03 (1991);
William L. F. Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming. .. , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 (1980-1981); Galanter, supra note 44; Emi-
lie M. Hafner-Burton, Brad LeVeck, David Victor & James Fowler, A Behavioral Approach to Interna-
tional Cooperation, 53 INT'L ORG. 699 (2015); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barri-
ers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994).
87. John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 157, 158, 176-78 (1989); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
88. For a classical approach on settlement and litigation, see Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in I
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. 2007); Andrew
F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Economic Theories of Settlement Bargaining, 1 ANNU. REV.
LAW & SOC. SCI. 35 (2005); Bruce Hay, Procedural Justice: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1803 (1997); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Rich-
ard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399 (1973).
89. The most obvious impact on settlement is on transaction costs, which mount as a dispute
proceeds. Attorney's fees are one of those costs, and rules assigning fees can affect the incentives of
parties to anticipate final judicial outcomes and work backwards to settlement. For a seminal analysis of
this rule, see Donohue, supra note 86; Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation ofLegal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing
Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141 (1998). For an excellent literature review on this theory, see Lucian
Bebchuk & Howard Chang, An Analysis ofFee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous
Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1996); Bruce Hay, Optimal
Contingent Fees in a World ofSettlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997).
90. Within the rules governing the actual litigation, there is rich literature examining elements
such as access to the legal system, prosecutorial costs (e.g., burden of proof), information costs (e.g.,
time of discovery), and sequencing of proceedings (e.g., splitting the liability and damages stages of
trial). See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (explaining the effects of the
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 changes such as jurisdictional bar, burden of proof, and other
protection for witnesses which changed the incentives to settle); Robert Cooter & Daniel Rubinfeld, An
Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 425 (1994) (for discovery); see also Charles
Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 2073 (2002); see generally ERIC
RASM-USEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (2d. ed. 1994).
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and 'informal' mechanisms prior to invoking formal court proceedings. 9 1 The
strength of the legal literature in this area is that it illuminates general factors
that may affect the behavior of litigants, yet as John J. Donohue points out: "the
factors that are uncovered frequently have conflicting effects . .. [and are] very
sensitive to [context and] institutional details." 92 Moreover, many of the find-
ings of this literature tend not to be relevant when the state or government
agency is a party to the process.
2. Asymmetric Information and Power
Settlement may also reflect structural asymmetries among contestants in a
legal process. Indeed, scholars often assume that a major motivation for settle-
ment is to extract benefits and take advantage of asymmetrical information or
bargaining power. 93 A central finding of legal scholarship is that asymmetric
information in fact reduces the possibility of agreeable solutions. The intuition
(confirmed by experimental research) behind this is that settlement is more
likely if the parties can accurately estimate the expected outcome, making it
easier to find mutually acceptable terms before a legal system runs its full
94
course.
Although thinner, some scholarship also examines how bargaining power
affects incentives to settle.95 For example, scholars have found that when a
more powerful defendant expects to be involved in a series of similar lawsuits,
s/he is more likely to settle with less powerful adversaries to avoid reputational
harm from publicly losing a case. 96 Powerful contestants may have a greater
ability to stop the clock through favorable, private settlement.
3. Avoiding Audience Costs
Indeed, for some litigants, settlement is favorable because it affords a
means of keeping inconvenient information and outcomes private. Within na-
tional legal systems, scholars have been particularly concerned about allowing
that logic to play out when the matters being adjudicated are not simply con-
91. Other incentives (or lack thereof) such as compulsory court-connected arbitration or medi-
ation have been debated in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An
Alternative View, 12 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 399, 404 (1990); JAMES S. KAKAL[K ET AL., RAND CORP., AN
EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT (1996).
92. Donohue, supra note 86, at 221.
93. See, e.g., John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J.
ECON. LIT. 45, 78 (1993) ("Actions by the court to encourage pretrial settlements ... may ... be self-
defeating, if the relevant private information is complicated."); see HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING:
OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS (1988); Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Cul-
pability, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587 (2002).
94. For surveys of the literature building on this result, see Robert Cooter & Daniel Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989), and Kennan
& Wilson, supra note 93.
95. For an example and discussion, see George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of
Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); see also Galanter, supra note 44.
96. Erichson, supra note 14 (discussing aggregate settlement).
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tractual interpretations but are rights or precedents created by general, public
law.9 7
Because these incentives intrinsically lead to secret outcomes, empirical
research is extremely difficult to conduct. In fact, despite the preeminent role
for privacy in the settlement process, systematic scholarship on the topic is only
emerging. 98 In the few instances where scholars have had insider, systematic
access to data on settlements-and thus have been able to look at the universe
of cases that include private settlements-many of the fears raised by those op-
posed to settlement have been confirmed. 99
Sealed settlement agreements have received more systematic treatment by
scholars. 00 These agreements allow litigants, under specific conditions, to
maintain secrecy on some aspects of the proceedings. Typically, the central ar-
gument for a sealed settlement rests on the value of retaining privacy for per-
sonal or confidential business information, with a high threshold and scrutiny.
Indeed, empirical work in the United States suggests sealing is rare and typical-
ly covers only the amount of settlement.o'0 As we will explain, however, confi-
dential settlements are more common in international dispute settlement.1 02
4. Litigiousness
Given the long history of worrying about settlement within the United
States, it seems logical that there would be studies that explore how settlement
varies across legal systems. Oddly, very little of that literature exists; most is
theoretical in nature, building on the arguments made by Fiss.103
Some of the explanation for lack of attention to settlement in other legal
systems may reflect a property of the U.S. legal system that comparativists
have long struggled to measure: litigiousness. While some literature suggests
97. Nixon v. Warner Commc'n Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("It is clear that the courts of
this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judi-
cial records and documents."); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 685, 703 (2004) ("Unlike open judicial
proceedings] arbitration proceedings . . . are confidential and arbitration rules and practices, except in
grievance arbitration, do not require a publicly available opinion explaining the reason for the deci-
sion.").
98. See VARDA BONDY & MAURICE SUNKIN, THE DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
LITIGATION: THE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC LAW CHALLENGES BEFORE FINAL HEARING (2009); Shavell,
supra note 32. For a similar, yet more limited assessment of the question, see Bondy & Sunkin, supra
note 46.
99. Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Dis-
crimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (2007).
100. Robert Reagan et al., Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court, 2004 FED.
JUD. CTR.
101. See Kotkin, supra note 99.
102. See infra, Section III.B.
103. Cf Dominique Allen, Against Settlement? Owen Fiss, ADR and Australian Discrimination
Law, 10 INT'L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 191 (2009). For a comparative analysis, see Inessa Love, Set-
tling Out of Court, WORLD BANK, Note No. 329 (Oct. 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282044-1307652042357/VP329-Setting-out-of-court.pdf.
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that the American legal system is not nearly as litigious as widely thought,' in
some areas such as the realm of class action lawsuits with punitive damages the
American system does create strong incentives for litigious behavior.105
By this logic, what is important about litigiousness is the way that legal
systems create incentives to file suits that make it possible to extort settlements
from the targets of that legal action or to manipulate precedent. This suggests
that the prevalence of legal action will depend on the prevailing rules and on
the incentives of parties to use litigation to signal resolve and extract outcomes
(material, precedential, or otherwise). For litigious firms, a pattern of such be-
havior can be beneficial because the filing of many cases creates a strong pub-
lic signal of resolve-a signal that is amplified if cases are settled and benefits
obtained before any unfavorable rulings. In the process, litigious firms may be-
come better at understanding the odds of success, at selecting cases that best
meet their goals, at dissecting successful arguments, and ultimately at generat-
ing useful precedent.
The literature on repeated play in courts is helpful in understanding this
behavior. In a classic study, Galanter documented how repeat players rely on
expertise built through multiple cases-following a strategy that seeks to max-
inmize gain over a series of cases, even at the risk of incurring some losses.' 06
Play is not just for wins in particular cases, but rather for more favorable rules
and interpretations over time. 0 7
Below, we will apply this logic to litigious firms who seek a reputation
for being tough as well as creating favorable strings of rulings that can shape
subsequent decisions by the small coterie of arbitrators (even in the absence of
formal stare decisis). This multi-play logic can unfold even when litigious
claimants do not win all individual cases and can terminate cases that go awry
through settlement.
B. Toward Explaining Settlements in International Adjudication
These four factors-rules, asymmetric information and power, avoidance
of audience costs, and litigiousness-give us a place to start when contemplat-
ing theories of settlement in international adjudication. In Table 1, we suggest
that these factors reflect two dimensions. One dimension is whether the factor
is a function of the environment in which parties operate or the preferences of
104. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Are Americans More Litigious? Some Quanti-
tative Evidence, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 69 (F. H. Buckley ed.,
2013).
105. CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (Deborah Hens-
ler, et al. eds, 2000); CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: How CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION (Deborah Hensler, et al. eds., 2016).
106. Fiss, supra note 12; Galanter, supra note 44. For a different perspective, see Robert D.
Friedman, Confusing the Means for the Ends: How a Pro-Settlement Policy Risks Undermining the Aims
of Title VI, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2013); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent
Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988); Shavell, supra note 32; Kathryn
E. Spier, Settlements Bargaining and the Design ofDamage Awards, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 84 (1994).
107. See supra note 42. On how repeat players, such as powerful corporations, can play for
precedent by privately settling cases that might create inconvenient precedents, see also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 42.
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individual parties. Environmental factors include the rules that govern settle-
ments generally or fundamental asymmetries in information and power. By
contrast, individual preferences can include litigiousness and the desire to avoid
the public eye in a particular case-because sunlight might reveal information
that helps competitors, brings harassment or hurts reputation. We see these as
ideal types that, in real world cases, could be reflected in multiple ways.
The other dimension is the extent to which these factors can be manipu-
lated with policy. Some factors are very hard to change even for determined
governments-asymmetries in power, for example, that are not readily erased
although policy can have an impact on the extent to which the powerful have
preferential access to information. Much of the policy reform effort has focused
on formal rules-such as rules on the standards for allowing settlements. Policy
might also affect the private incentives for secrecy-think of reforms in liabil-
ity rules-designed in part to manipulate the private incentive for litigiousness,
which could be an attribute of individual litigants.







This matrix offers a starting point for examining the theories and individ-
ual factors that might help explain patterns of secrecy and settlement at the in-
ternational level. We take up that task in Part III.
Before turning to international dispute settlement-and ICSID in particu-
lar-we first consider where and how international institutions are different
from those that operate at the national level and how those differences might
alter how we build a theory of international settlement and secrecy on the back
of the much better established and tested theories that operate nationally-
notably in the United States. We look at the question of the relevance of na-
tional experience for building and testing a theory from two different angles.
First, our focus is theory-building and testing in the realm of investor-
state arbitration but our goal is to understand, as well, where these theories
might be more broadly relevant. Our scope conditions for that effort are largely
in the realm of international economic law, where there are a wide range of le-
gal instruments that entrain issues similar to investor-state arbitration-they in-
volve strong private interests that can trigger (directly, as in the case of inves-
Rules for Disclosure Litigiousness
Asymmetric Avoidance of Audience
Information & Power Costs
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tor-state arbitration, or indirectly, as in the case of most other inter-state pro-
cesses) disputes that have large, tangible economic benefits and costs for the
parties. The contestation pits private interests against those of governments that
have traditionally enjoyed a national policy prerogative. Relevant decisions are
made by experts who are operating in an environment of uncertainty about the
best legal interpretations.
Second, we nonetheless note that one of the factors from our review of
the national literature may seem particularly far removed from the handling of
international legal disputes: litigiousness. International courts and tribunals, it
may be thought, offer fewer benefits to repeat players who file many costly
suits to signal resolve. Moreover, part of the logic for litigiousness within na-
tional legal systems rests on the ability to select cases and settlements to ulti-
mately control precedent. Yet, most international decisions-including inves-
tor-state arbitration awards-do not formally create precedent. In other words,
there is no formal stare decisis rule.
We believe these differences have been overstated as this is an environ-
ment that favors de facto precedents. As international adjudication rises, the
benefits to players from selecting cases and venues and signaling resolve have
grown massively. Moreover, even where precedent may not formally exist, pri-
or international decisions are nonetheless extremely important because they can
coalesce into a 'jurisprudence constant" that guides adjudicative bodies to re-
solve similar cases in analogical fashion. 08
Indeed, contestants can bring cases to signal resolve. Many of the firms
that have filed multiple cases at ICSID are in the infrastructure, mining, and
hydrocarbon industries.109 These firms have large incentives to signal resolve
to recover millions of dollars in sunk costs. They also have strong incentives to
shape investment law and signal resolve across multiple cases since they work
in many countries on similar projects and face similar threats by different gov-
ernments.
Looking beyond those industries where there are long-lived tangible capi-
tal assets, similar issues are now arising for firms that have high-value brands.
Consider, notably, the cases brought by Philip Morris against Uruguay and
Australia, referenced above. These cases exemplify how the logic of litigious-
ness may apply more widely in other heavily regulated industries as well-to
both signal resolve and create precedent. In addition to investor-state arbitra-
tions, Philip Morris has brought, directly or indirectly, multiple actions against
recent health regulations before multiple courts and tribunals-notably, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Asso-
108. Helfer, supra note 5, at 471 ("ICs view their prior decisions as persuasive, especially when
they have coalesced into a jurisprudence constant."); see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty
Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND
FUTURE OF TRE DISCIPLINE 265, 280 (C.B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that in ISDS "gradually
one may expect the institution of a jurisprudence constante, and the emergence of key decisions that are
judged to be the influential starting points from which further analysis should flow").
109. See infra Section IV.B.4.
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ciation States, and the World Trade Organization. " 0 At the same time, it has
sought to obtain favorable rulings that would treat information in such cases as
"presumptively confidential""' In both the Australia and Uruguay investor-
state proceedings, Philip Morris agreed only to make public information strictly
requiredl 2-it notably resisted the disclosure of filings of legal briefs, hearing
transcripts, settlement agreements, and its own submissions, to prevent what
they called a "trial by media.',113 However, behind such strategy there is a so-
phisticated use of legal standards to test different arguments before different
tribunals, to influence the development of legal rules and perhaps even chill
regulatory efforts. According to the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, Philip
Morris threatened poor African countries considering similar tobacco control
legislation with massive lawsuits-that is, it has used threats of costly legal ac-
tion to signal resolve.114 Moreover, while the dismissal of Philip Morris's case
without addressing the legal merits provided a decisive victory to Australia, un-
certainty remains about how precisely investment agreements constrain tobacco
control efforts-in part due to this strategy that resulted in the lack of unanimi-
ty in the recent victory by Uruguay." 5
To be sure, it is one thing for a claimant to initiate arbitration to prove its
willingness to spend millions of dollars defending investments or to 'chill' reg-
ulation around the world; it is another for a litigant to attempt to control prece-
dent by agreeing to settle and to publish only those favorable awards. Our point
is that the dynamics hypothesized to exist within national legal systems about
repeat play are now being observed, in different ways and not without caveats,
within the international realm.
III. INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE CASE OF IC SID
In this Part, we explain the basics of ICSID and investor-state arbitration.
That creates the foundation for exploring how the incentives for secrecy and
settlement actually play out in this adjudicatory setting-a task we take on in
Part IV.
110. See generally Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 383 (2016).
111. Philip Morris Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Procedural
Order No. 5, 1 14 (Nov. 30, 2012); Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 383, 383-86, 408-12 (2016) (describing the cases brought before international dispute settle-
ment by tobacco companies).
112. Philip Morris Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Procedural
Order No. 5 (Nov. 30, 2012).
113. Id.¶23.
114. Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Finns' Strategy Limits Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-limit-
poorer-nations-smoking-laws.html.
115. See Philip Morris Products S.A. & Abal Hermanos v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 11 235-309, (July 8, 2016); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v Common-
wealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015).
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A. ICSID and Investor-State Arbitration
ICSID is one of the five international organizations that integrate the
WBG. ICSID was designed to facilitate the resolution of disputes between
states and foreign investors to "stimulat[e] a larger flow of private international
capital."" 7
ICSID is not a court. Instead, it was established as a secretariat, and creat-
ed uniform procedural rules for arbitration and a methodology for appointing
tribunals. ICSID tribunals adjudicate a wide range of disputes arising out of
cross-border investments, many of which are energy-related disputes, often
ranging in the billions of dollars." 8 ICSID's secretariat provides administrative
support for such investor-state arbitrations originating mostly under a network
of international treaties (or BITs) and regional trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA
or DR-CAFTA), but also investment contracts and foreign investment laws."l 9
To access ICSID tribunals, investors can trigger a process if their investments
are affected by a harmful, unfair, discriminatory, or expropriatory conduct by a
host State member of ICSID.1 20
Established in 1967 through a multilateral convention, the institution
struggled to build a caseload. The first dispute submitted to ICSIiD was regis-
tered in 1972.121 Through the 1980s it expanded modestly. In the 1990s-with
the Soviet collapse and the rapid proliferation of BITs and free-trade agree-
ments that often provided for states' consent to arbitration-investor-state arbi-
tration became much more relevant.1 22 This was an era when market-oriented
economic organization, based on the assumption of efficiency in private enter-
prise, triumphed over alternative forms of economic organization; it led many
emerging economies to embrace BITs as a way to signal that market-oriented
reforms were credible. ICSID was widely seen as the linchpin to that credibility
as transnational corporations perceived arbitration as less biased against them
compared to national courts. Investors, reassured by the credibility and en-
forceability of this international adjudication system, would invest. 123 However,
116. Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The five organizations
of the WBG are: IFC, MIGA, IBRD, IDA, and ICSID.
117. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes between States and Nationals of Other States, Sec. II, 19, IBRD (Mar. 18, 1965). ICSID was giv-
en a simple organizational structure consisting of an administrative council and a secretariat. The Secre-
tariat lead by a Secretary-General acts as registrar and provides information, albeit limited, on all
proceedings.
118. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Ecuador Must Pay $1.76 billion US to Occidental for Ex-
propriation of Oil Investment, IAREPORTER (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.iareporter.com.
119. Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Cen-
trefor Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 22 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 55 (2007).
120. See Puig, supra note 17.
121. Pierre Lalive, The First 'World Bank'Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Legal
Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 127-28 (1980) (discussing Holiday Inns v. Morocco, ICSID Case
No. ARB/72/1); see also ICSID, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT (1971-1972).
122. See NEWS FROM ICSID, ICSID Summer 1993, at 1 (announcing that with Russia and other
former Soviet States the Convention reached 124 signatories).
123. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION (2010) (arguing that BITs were designed to increase predictability for
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the practical utility of BITs and ICSID clauses to stimulate the flux of foreign
investment continues to be debated. 124
As of December 31, 2016, ICSID had registered 597 cases. 12 Almost all
cases in the last two decades have relied on treaties and around one-third in-
volved Latin American countries.126 The growth in the number of cases has
supported ICSID's claims of the success of the institution and legitimacy of its
arbitration process. It has also exposed some problems with the institutional
framework, including, as we now discuss, its transparency policies.127
B. ICSID and Transparency
1. Between Private and Public Domains
ICSID and investor-state arbitration operate at the seams between private
and public law, contractual and general rights and obligations, individual and
state participation, and national and international law. This "hybrid" role helps
to explain why investor-state arbitration has been the focus of contests between
private and public interests. Chief among these concerns has been transparency,
notably when disputes involve challenges to public law and policy such as taxa-
tion and environmental, health, and social regulation.
As these concerns have grown, policy responses at ICSID have not come
easily-in part because the foundation of ICSID was originally laid in a way
that created a presumption against the disclosure of decisions without the con-
sent of the parties. The main legal consequence of such a presumption is that
unless the instrument establishing the jurisdiction of the Centre (e.g., BITs)
provides otherwise, the parties to the dispute control the access to most of the
foreign investors and thus investment levels); Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The
Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT'L ORG. 401 (2011)
(demonstrating that when violations of investment treaties are found that investment declines); Tom
Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Gov-
ernance, 25 INT'L. REV. L. & EcoN. 107 (2005) (arguing that BITs work by providing an institutional
environment that is more credible than national institutions and thus increase investment in countries
that have the hardest time attracting investment on their own); Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD
DEV. 1567 (2005) (focusing on whether BITs, in particular, increase investment); Jason W. Yackee, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evi-
dence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397 (2010) (making the case that BITs have varied effects on investment lev-
els).
124. See, e.g., Christian Bellak, How Bilateral Investment Treaties Impact on Foreign Direct
Investment: A Meta-analysis of Public Policy, Prepared for 2013 MAER Network Colloquium (2013),
www2.gre.ac.uk/.
125. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS (ISSUE 2017-1), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%2Web% 2 0Stats%202017-
1%20(English)%20Final.pdf. As of May 2017, 405 of the cases are reported as 'concluded.' See The
ICSID Caseload - Statistics, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ConcludedCases
.aspx?status-c (last visited May 2017).
126. Id. at II (South America 24%, Centro-America and the Caribbean 6%, North-America
5%.
127. Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Re-
ality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY Xxxvii, XXXix
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) ("The critiques aimed at the investment regime tend to divide into two
categories: procedural and substantive . . . . These [procedural] demands fall under the broad banner of
transparency, comprising among other aspects, requirements of publicity and administrative fairness.").
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information about proceedings. Within those constraints, ICSID has periodical-
ly modified the institution's Rules and Regulations (but not the ICSID Conven-
tion), as well as its general practices. 128
2. A History ofLimited Transparency
ICSID, perhaps because it is part of the WBG, has been under regular and
increasing pressure to disclose information about its operations.129 The organi-
zation's leadership has responded to these pressures with a series of reforms
that began in the 1980s and that continue to the present day. For instance, in
1984 then-Secretary General Shihata ordered the first extensive revision of the
ICSID rules and regulations, yielding modest changes in the access to docu-
ments and record keeping. More significantly, Shihata commissioned studies of
ICSID jurisprudence for the purpose of verifying its consistency as a "confi-
dence-building measure."l30 Chief among the efforts was the decision to open
the archives to select scholars, leading notably to a 2001 casebook that was the
first comprehensive scholarly account of how ICSID actually operates.' 3 1
A surge in the late-1990s of cases relying on treaties (as opposed to con-
tracts or investment laws) 132 and in sectors such as communication, water and
sanitation, and transportation created a wave of criticisms against the organiza-
tion. Once shielded from mainstream politics, ICSID (and investor-state arbi-
tration more generally) became an important part of the focus of civil society
organizations and NGOs due to the high profile of some disputes, primarily un-
der NAFTA.1 33 Such cases included claims by investors seeking compensation
for the Canadian government's ban on the import and inter-provincial transpor-
tation of the fuel additive MMT (Ethyl),134 Mexico's denial of a permit to con-
struct a facility for the disposal of hazardous waste (Metalclad),'135 and alleged
damages resulting from a California ban on the use or sale of the gasoline addi-
128. Any amendment to the ICSID Convention requires the ratification, acceptance or approval
by all contracting States. The modification of ICSID's Rules and Regulations instead only requires ap-
proval by two-thirds of the Administrative Council.
129. PARRA, supra note 16, at 138-41, 323.
130. ICSID, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1984) (arguing in favor of the Secretariat preparing a
digest of the legal principles applied by ICSID tribunals, with the goal of helping "the general develop-
ment of the law applicable to investment disputes and as such will serve an important public purpose").
131. See CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001) [herein-
after SCHREUER f].
132. During the first twenty-five years, with the exception of three cases, all the disputes before
ICSID originated in international investment contracts (mining, oil, and other similar concessions). The
exception cases are Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990); Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Repub-
lic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992); Klickner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case
No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment (May 3, 1985).
133. ICSID, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2000).
134. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada was settled for $13 million after an Award on Jurisdiction was is-
sued on June 24, 1998, and after a domestic panel found Canada in breach of the inter-provincial
Agreement on Internal Trade. See Joint Press Release, John Manley, Industry Minister & Christine
Stewart, Envir. Minister of Canada (July 20, 1998).
135. Supra note 58, at 130.
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tive MTBE for environmental reasons (Methanex).136 Numerous NGOs argued
that investor-state arbitration represented the bankruptcy of public policy and a
form of undemocratic international law-making,' 37 a point echoed with promi-
nent news accounts leading to calls for more oversight and transparency.138
At the same time, multilateral development organizations-including the
WBG-were also under pressure for transparency to the broader public and
NGOs. While it is hard to date when this movement exactly took off, the inflec-
tion point led to several reforms to the practice of NAFTA investor-state arbi-
tration between 2001 and 2003. These reforms informed the 2006 amendments
to ICSID's rules and procedures which included provisions allowing non-
disputing parties to attend oral hearings if the disputing parties do not object,
the prompt publication of excerpts of legal reasoning in non-public awards as
well as other provisions to make decisions more accessible. 139 Those reforms,
however, did not modify in any way the ability of parties to stop disputes with
settlements. Nor did they alter the ability to keep those settlements secret.
In October 2016, ICSI) began work on further updating and modernizing
the ICSID Rules and Regulations.1 40 Hence, the timeliness of this work.
IV. SECRECY AND SETTLEMENT AT ICSID: STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
In this Part, we introduce our dataset of all cases filed and concluded be-
fore ICSID until April 20, 2012.141 Our focus (the unit of analysis) is the claim-
ant-case. Our first dependent variable, Secret, describes whether the full final
outcome of a concluded case was formally disclosed with the consent of the
parties (0) or concealed (1). Our second dependent variable, Settlement, de-
scribes whether the case was concluded by settlement (1) or by a formal deci-
sion (0).
136. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Uncitral, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005) (describing where-
in a U.S. $1 billion claim was made by a Canadian investor for alleged injuries when California banned
use or sale of the gasoline additive MTBE; methanol is used to manufacture MTBE).
137. PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: BANKRUPTING
DEMOCRACY (2001), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFl86.PDF; HOWARD MANN, IISD & WWF-
U.S., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA'S CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON
INVESTOR RIGHTS (2001); see also Vicki Been, Does an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine
Make Sense?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 49 (2002).
138. Anthony De Palma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes,
but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11 /business/nafita-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunals-settle-
disputes-but-go-too-far.html.
139. Aur6lia Antonietti, The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the
Additional Facility Rules, 21 ICSID REv. 427 (2006). While the publication of excerpts helps to provide
some additional information about cases, it nonetheless makes it impossible to figure out reliably im-
portant information. For the purpose of this study, we designate an outcome transparent when the
awards are published.
140. ICSID News Release, Invitation to File Suggestions for Rule Amendments (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID= 2 13.
141. For full details of the dataset and coding, see Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus
Flexibility, supra note 20, at Annex 1. The figure includes a handful of the earliest cases concluded in
2012. Thus, the list is not representative of the full roster of cases in that year. Also, approximately one-
third of the observations in our data involve multiple claimants.
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Statistically, this section makes two empirical observations. First, we
show that recent efforts to create a norm of transparency are not associated with
a reduction in the overall probability of secrecy over time. Second, we evaluate
the association between our dependent variables and the four factors that the
literature on national settlements has identified as important. We show that
some of the same factors that are associated with secrecy are more broadly also
associated with settlement.
A. Patterns in the Dependent Variables: Secrecy and Settlement
As ICSID has handled a growing number of cases over the years, secrecy
too has risen. However, while the pressure for transparency is higher than ever
before, a large fraction of the awards (about forty percent) are still kept formal-
ly secret. Figure 2 illustrates the historical patterns of secrecy as they have de-
veloped over time.142
Figure 2: Historical Patterns ofSecrecy at ICSID, 1975-2012
In ICSID proceedings, secrecy can be obtained in three ways. First, if a
tribunal is allowed to proceed fully to the issuance of an arbitral award under
Rule 47 (on jurisdiction or merits), one of the parties to the dispute may decide
to withhold consent for publication. Unless the investment instrument that
grants jurisdiction to ICSID speaks to this matter, the parties have the discre-
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tion to determine whether ICSID may disclose the award. 143 About twenty-five
percent of secret cases in our dataset are concealed through this fashion.
Second, a case may be discontinued if a party to the dispute fails to take
any steps in the proceeding for six consecutive months-for example, if it stops
paying the fees to carry out the proceedings. Less than five percent of the cases
have been discontinued on this basis, most of them for failure to pay the arbi-
tration fees. In such case, a discontinuance is pursued under Rule 45.' 44
Third, the most common path to secrecy is to terminate a case prior to a
final decision by the tribunal. As a procedural matter, this is what we code as
Settlement and can arise in three distinct ways: (1) the parties formally agree to
a negotiated resolution; (2) the parties agree to discontinue the proceeding
without a formal resolution; and (3) one party to the dispute requests that the
case be discontinued, and there is no objection from the other party.1 45
Most Settlements in our dataset are of the first two types ((1) and (2))-
both of which are handled under ICSID Arbitration Rule 43. 146 Two distinc-
tions are important. First, the parties can agree to discontinue a proceeding
without formally resolving a dispute. In fact, in at least two ICSID cases the
parties agreed to discontinue the proceeding and continue the dispute under a
different set of arbitration rules and institutional support. 147 Other rules and in-
stitutions are often less accommodating to transparency concerns, but we as-
sumed-unless we found evidence to the contrary-that the cases discontinued
were actually resolved and did not proceed under different rules.
Second, not all settlements under Rule 43 are completely secret. In fact,
the parties to a proceeding can agree to embody a settlement in an award and
decide to make some or all of the case information available to the public.148
In the third type of "settlement," handled under ICSID Arbitration Rule
44, a party may request discontinuance and, where there is no objection, dis-
continuance is granted.1 49 Approximately fifteen percent of settled ICSID pro-
ceedings in our dataset have been terminated this way. In our statistical models,
which we introduce below, we also identify this type of discontinuance as Set-
tlement because we consider it a different way of achieving settlement-like out-
143. See, e.g., Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11, NAFTA FREE TRADE
COMMISSION (July 31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding-e.asp.
Rule 48 of the Arbitration Rules provides that: "The Centre shall not publish the award without the con-
sent of the parties."
144. We excluded this small proportion of cases from the analysis because the ultimate fate of
these cases is very hard to track.
145. The second and third ways may not be settlements in the strict sense but nonetheless re-
flect that the parties agree not to fight the matter formally in arbitration (Arbitration Rules 43-45).
146. ICSID, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATION AND RULES (2006).
147. Cargill, Inc. v. Poland, Case Details, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/
casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/04/2 (last visited May 1, 2017) ("At the request of the parties, and
with the Tribunal's consent, the proceeding continues with the same Tribunal under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules."); E.T.I. Euro Telecom Int'l N.V. v. Republic of Bolivia, No. 08 Civ. 4247, 2008 WL
2940583 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008).
148. Only two of such settlements in our data are not concealed (only one as an excerpt).
149. ICSID Arbitration Rule 44.
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comes. 1o In our analysis, however, we take care to ensure that our findings are
not the result of our rather broad definition of settlement.' 51
Figure 3 illustrates the historical patterns of settlement. It shows the num-
ber of secret cases terminated each year through settlement and those conclud-
ed by parties that refused to allow ICSID to formally publish the final arbitral
award. As observed, settlements have been commonly made since the early
days of arbitration.












B. Four Independent Variables
As explained earlier in Part II, the existing literature broadly suggests four
factors that might explain the incentives for parties to settle cases in domestic
settings and to use settlement to shield some or all of the information that par-
ties do not want aired publicly. Here, we work through all four factors at the
international level, arraying them as a contest between public incentives for
transparency and private incentives for secrecy.
150. The existence of a settlement is easy to observe even if its contents are not publicly known
because ICSID records the discontinuance under Rule 43.
151. The difference between Rules 43 and 44 is that Rule 44 is based on the actions of a single
party and in some cases has been used to shift a case from ICSID to other fora. Rule 43, by contrast, is
more closely related to the classic legal notion of a mutually negotiated termination.
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1. Rules for Disclosure
First, we assess the role of rules and procedures. While ICSID rules allow
secrecy, a growing number of treaty rules require the disclosure of awards.
Thus, one should expect that when the underlying instruments that serve as the
basis for the arbitration require disclosure-as, for example, with the treaty
based on the model U.S. BIT or Canada's Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement-then secrecy should not be the outcome. 152
Procedural rules can affect transparency in many ways. In addition to re-
quiring outright disclosure, procedure may also reflect how arbitral outcomes
are enforced. One of the strengths of the ICSID Convention process is that its
awards are automatically enforceable against member states and insulated from
scrutiny by domestic courts. Thus, claimants can obtain compensation directly
from the respondent state while both sides, if they so choose, can still keep the
award secret. However, when one country is not a member of the Convention,
then an option for using the ICSID arbitration process is under ICSID's Addi-
tional Facility (AF) Rules. In such a setting, awards are not automatically en-
forceable and are often referred to domestic courts for additional scrutiny and,
ultimately, enforcement. 153 Knowing this, we estimate litigants will more often
agree to public disclosure because a public domestic court ruling may be re-
quired to enforce the award. Thus, we also identify AFProceeding (as a binary
variable)-which accounts for about ten percent of all cases-and expect that
these proceedings will create some incentive for parties to disclose awards.
In order to determine whether secret arbitration declined after the reforms
to ICSID rules and practices began to take effect, we code Reform as the num-
ber of years from the year 2001. This measure is at best an approximation be-
cause we have no way to directly measure transparency-related reform other
than to differentiate between pre- and post-reform periods. Although ICSID's
own efforts began in the 1980s, the most substantive reforms began roughly
around the year 2001 (when NAFTA introduced the transparency requirements)
and gained prominence over time, such as with the 2004 US Model BIT and the
2006 formal reforms to ICSID rules. They also include efforts to disseminate
information more widely through newsletters, the ICSID website, and special-
ized publications, as well as greater access for third parties. As a first effort, we
thus measure Reform as the number of years since 2001 so that the strength of
the reform variable grows with time, reflecting our expectation that the practi-
cal effect of reforms deepens with time and experience.
152. See, e.g., United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty arts. 19, 29, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (2012) [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
BIT/o20text%20for/2OACIEP%2OMeeting.pdf; Canada Model Agreement for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments arts. 38, 49, (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Canadian Model BIT],
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
153. To ensure the enforceability of the awards, Article 19 of the AF Rules mandates all pro-
ceedings to be held in a state that is party to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 16, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S 38. Such provisions require,
among other things, that the party applying for recognition and enforcement supply "[t]he duly authenti-
cated original award or a duly certified copy thereof." Id. art. 4.
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Finally, rules and procedures within countries might also explain why
some parties can readily keep information secret. The lack of well-developed
democratic institutions may correspond with the lack of domestic legal re-
quirements and expectations of public transparency as well as a dearth of inde-
pendent pressure groups. 154 Indeed, a move towards democratic rule is widely
associated with greater disclosure of information related to the conduct of pub-
lic institutions and public policy. We thus assess the respondent's level of De-
mocracy as a proxy of rules and procedures within national law that will favor
or require public discussion of awards or settlements. 155
2. Asymmetric Information and Power
To account for the often-substantial power imbalances between respond-
ent, or host, and claimant's states, we measure the log of both states' GDP per
capita as well as the respondent's inward FDI as a proportion of GDP.156 While
imperfect measures, these are a first effort to explore whether the logic of
asymmetries in power and dependence that figures prominently in the domestic
literature applies to international arbitration as well.
3. Avoiding Audience Costs
There are many reasons why parties to investor-state arbitration might
want to keep as many of the details of their cases away from broader public
view. Here, we explore three that are plausibly the most important.
First, a central factor in public disclosure of outcomes, we suggest, is the
type of investment at stake. Specifically, the incentives for secrecy are likely to
be stronger for parties in disputes over investments that have long time hori-
zons or industries that are highly sensitive to changes in local regulation and
taxation.
Part of the original logic for creating arbitration as a means of attracting
investment is that long-lived infrastructure could be highly beneficial to coun-
tries, yet investors face the risk of obsolescing bargains: "hardware bolted to
the ground is ripe for expropriation."157 One of the central functions of invest-
ments backed by independent adjudication is to temper the host country's in-
centive to undermine the ability of investors to recover their costs and reasona-
154. See Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L
STUD. Q. 291 (1999); Mike Burke, Book Review, 29 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 415 (1996) (reviewing SIDNEY
TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS (1994)).
See generally James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and
Transparency, 73 J. POL. 1191 (2011).
155. Our measure of democracy is a 21-point scale collected by Monty G. Marshall & Ted
Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, Ctr. For
Systemic Peace, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last updated June 6, 2014).
156. Our measures of GDP and FDI come from World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last updated Mar. 29, 2017).
157. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF US
ENTERPRISES (1971); see also Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment
in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries, 38 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 121 (2006).
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ble profits.1s Prior to making the investment the investor who controls the cap-
ital allocation decision has a huge asymmetry in power; once the investment is
sunk the asymmetry shifts in favor of the host country. These are highly famil-
iar arguments in the realm of investment law; here we extend them to explore
possible implications for settlement and secrecy.
Both investors and host countries know that investments that have long
time horizons will be highly sensitive to changes in local regulation and taxa-
tion. A power plant that is profitable under one tariff and thus a highly attrac-
tive foreign investment could be financially ruinous with different tariffs, fuel
costs, or tax treatment of profits. 59 Both parties know that making such pro-
jects viable will require a long-term relationship and that management of the
project will often involve politically messy bargains and concessions, such as
changes in tariffs or tax laws or payments to investors that parties would like to
keep private. If visible to domestic audiences, such deals would be costly to
sustain. When that management process fails, then a case may be filed with the
hope that tribunals will clarify the exact letter of the law (treaties, legislation, or
contracts) and its consequences. As clarity emerges, both sides have an incen-
tive to put cases to a stop. And while the party that has obtained more through
the process might have an incentive to celebrate its gains, making most awards
or settlements public requires both parties to agree. Thus is the logic that leads
to secrecy-especially secrecy through settlement-for long-lived investments
of this type. We examine this logic in much more detail below when we look to
a case study on natural gas pipelines in Bangladesh-a quintessential long-
lived investment whose financial viability requires politically sensitive ongoing
management that the parties know is best done behind closed doors."' A simi-
lar logic may unfold for shorter-lived investments, but the pressure for ongoing
management and politically difficult concessions is much weaker the shorter
the investment horizon.
To be sure, we cannot directly measure the intended or actual lifespan of
an investment under dispute. Thus, to evaluate this claim, we identified dis-
putes pertaining to LongLived investments based on sectors, such as electricity
and electric infrastructure, hydrocarbon supply and infrastructure, mining, ports
and airports and roads, railroads and transport infrastructure and distinguished
them from all other investments. 161
A second factor, we suggest, is reputational. For several decades, political
scientists have sought to explain how bargaining within international institu-
158. W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best
Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L.J. 185, 185-92 (2009) ("A common feature of foreign direct
investment is that the investor has sunk substantial capital in the host [s]tate, and cannot withdraw it or
simply suspend delivery and write off a small loss as might a trader in a long-term trading relation-
ship.").
159. Woodhouse, supra note 157; see also THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POWER SECTOR
REFORM: THE EXPERIENCES OF FIVE MAJOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (David G. Victor and Thomas
Heller, eds., 2006).
160. See infra Section V.C.
161. We coded LongLived (which scores I for about 50 percent of the cases in our study) from




tions is affected by incentives at the national level. Central to that work has
been the idea that "games" at the international level are often played with an
eye to how information revealed or hidden has impacts (costs) for important
domestic audiences.162 Equally central is the role of reputation. Recent devel-
opments at ICSID strongly support the idea that governments pay close atten-
tion to their reputation. For instance, some countries that have lost often at
ICSID have failed to disclose the decision or have announced their intention to
leave the institution. Brazilian leaders, in part fearing an institution they see as
possibly biased against them, have never joined.
Reputational concerns translate in different ways in investor-state arbitra-
tion. For instance, predictions of victory are shrouded in uncertainty since in-
vestor-state arbitration is a complicated process; legal standards are still unfold-
ing; tribunals are convened one-off for each case; and many prior awards are
not published, which can make it particularly difficult to know how any new
case would be decided. However, respondents can lift the fog, a bit, by looking
to their own history. Hence, we expect that respondents with a history of past
public losses will be more inclined to keep future arbitration secret-having
already lost a case, the government is prone to fear it may lose again and might
even believe that the system is stacked against them.
To assess the role of reputation, we evaluated whether respondents with a
history of losing are more likely to shroud arbitration in secrecy. To do so, we
identified the LossesR for all of a respondent's previous public cases. Some
countries-notably Argentina and Egypt-have gone into recent cases with a
history of many public losses. To identify these losses, we read the text of each
case and observed the votes of each arbitrator. We code a respondent as having
lost if two or more arbitrators reject the state's main arguments. If a case is
dismissed in its entirety, the respondent has 'won.'
Finally, the risk of revealing information about corruption during an
ICSID case could be a powerful incentive for one or more of the parties to keep
the proceedings secret-an incentive that outweighs other benefits of transpar-
ency, such as earning a reputation for compliance with investment laws. While
the need to account for corruption is clear, actually doing that is very difficult.
Standard corruption indexes do not have the time coverage or the focus on cor-
ruption related to foreign investment that would be needed for this purpose.
Here, our approach is to identify whether either the respondent (BriberyR)
or the claimant's (Briberyc) home governments had ratified the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions (or a comparable instrument) at the time the dispute was reg-
istered at ICSID. The OECD Convention does not set detailed standards for
anti-corruption policies. Rather, it requires that governments adopt and imple-
162. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
(Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993); INTERNATIONALIZATION AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert 0. Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996); HELEN V. MILNER,
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1997); Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L
ORG. 427 (1988). For a review, see Emilie Hafner-Burton, David Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Sci-
ence Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012).
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ment laws that make bribery of foreign public officials a criminal offense, in-
cluding "dissuasive criminal penalties." 163
4. Litigiousness
Finally, we believe that, for investors, the incentives for secrecy will de-
pend on why the firm is filing a case. Firms do business in many countries and
vary enormously in how they use the courts and other legal mechanisms to ad-
vance their interests. Increasingly, the availability of third party financing for
litigation is altering decisions to litigate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
firms do vary in the extent to which they use adjudication to signal resolve or to
obtain compensation.16 Some use legal systems only as a final recourse-
when all other options, notably negotiation, have failed. Such firms will bear
the cost of bringing such cases only when they are confident of a win. Other
firms are highly litigious. For a litigious firm-that is, a firm that as a matter of
strategy files many cases with the goal of signaling resolve and obtaining the
most favorable legal rulings and precedents-the purpose of filing a case is to
show a willingness to bear costs and to impose costs on others across a whole
portfolio of possible cases. For litigious firms, the game of arbitration is about
earning a reputation for being tough and creating favorable case law, not neces-
sarily for winning any singular case.
To evaluate this idea, we assess the impact of Litigiousnessc by claim-
ants. We do so by identifying the number of times an investor had brought a
case to ICSID over the course of our study-some had done so as many as six
times. This measure is admittedly another imperfect proxy but is a best first ef-
fort to capture the concept of litigiousness as a form of corporate strategy that is
stable over time rather than changing with each new potential case. Our as-
sumption is that because litigation is an element of corporate strategy, a com-
pany knows whether it is prone to litigation even before it brings multiple cases




Table 1 below presents these statistical results exploring the likelihood
that a case formally remains secret (Column 1), as well as the likelihood of any
kind of settlement (Column 2) and of a secret settlement (Column 3).16 In An
163. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 3, Dec. 19, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 1.
164. See STEVEN COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER 425 (2012)
(describing Exxon's legal strategy against Venezuela as a test "of Tillerson's willingness to endure eco-
nomic losses for the sake of policy and principle"). Admittedly, this is a proxy that is of very limited
help.
165. In our study, approximately twenty-five percent of claimants have filed more than once at
ICSID and are to some degree litigious. The most litigious investors are based in Western democracies
such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States.
166. Column I presents the logit estimates from Equation 1 predicting Secret arbitration. Col-
umn 2 presents similar estimates predicting Settlement. Column 3 presents estimates of Settlement from
a restricted model that constrains Secret to a value of I in order to identify only those settlements that
are kept secret. We interpret the estimates in Column 3 with caution given the scarcity of data.
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nex 1, we complement the analysis and discuss the robustness of these findings
with a wide array of additional statistical tests.
Based on the above discussion, we evaluate secrecy-and then the specif-
ic choice of settlement-as the mechanism for obtaining secrecy by estimating
the following logit model:
Equation 1
Pr(Secret=1)= f (80 + f/lReform + 82AdditionalFacility +
I3BriberyConventioncR + 84DemocracyR +/J5GDPCR+ 86InwardFDIR +
/l7LongLived + fl8LossesR + f9PublicCaseR + f8 OLitigiousc + e) 167
167. Subscript C refers to the claimant's home government, while subscript R refers to the re-
spondent government.
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Table 1: Predicting Secret Arbitration Outcomes at ICSID, 1972-2012
Secret Settled Secret Settlement
LongLived 0.742** 0.767** 0.24
(0.268) (0.277) (0.523)
LossesR 1.234*** 0.830** 1.076
(0.303) (0.300) (0.762)
PublicCaseSR -0.818*** -0.546* -0.806
(0.238) (0.237) (0.544)
Litigiousc 0.401** 0.569*** 0.798*
(0.149) (0.152) (0.376)
Reform 0.209*** 0.098 -0.004
(0.063) (0.061) (0.101)
Additional Facility -2.405*** -1.785* -1.032
(0.684) (0.777) (1.39)
BriberyR -1.074* 0.091 2.719*
(0.457) (0.440) (1.302)
Briberyc -1.429*** -1.093** -0.356
(0.417) (0.411) (0.849)
GDPR (Log) 0.219 0.089 -0.043
(0.138) (0.140) (0.23)
GDPc (Log) 0.746** 0.514* -0.178
(0.268) (0.254) (0.453)
PolityR 0.042 -0.013 -0.106*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.048)
Polityc -0.143* -0.094 -0.006
(0.073) (0.059) (0.083)
FDIR (Log) -0.139 -0.109 0.023
(0.122) (0.118) (0.189)
Intercept -8.848*** -6.467* 2.467
(2.622) (2.576) (4.780)
N 339 339 132
Log Likelihood -181.25 -177.06 -58.71
Prob > chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.0033**
Pseudo R2 0.2 0.1712 0.2091
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1)
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1. Rules for Disclosure
As expected, cases brought under AF Rules are much less likely to be
concealed, and they are also less likely to be concluded through settlement.1 68
However, contrary to our expectation, ICSID's own reform efforts to create a
norm of transparency over time-encapsulated in our variable Reform-are not
associated with a reduction in the overall probability that arbitration is conclud-
ed with secrecy. In fact, the occurrence of the transparency reforms beginning
in 2001 corresponds with a likelihood of more secret outcomes than prior to the
reform efforts, and they bear no relationship to settlement.
In order to determine whether this association is simply a false artifact of
our decision to code ICSID's reforms beginning at a particular point of time,
we also plot the predicted probabilities of secret outcomes at different points of
time-what we refer to as the year of reform 'treatment'.1 69 For example, Fig-
ure 3 shows that cases filed on or after 1995 had about a 35 percent statistical
probability of being kept secret; after 2005 that probability rose to 50 per-
cent.170 In effect, the probability of secret outcomes has risen just at the same
time that ICSID launched its most intensive efforts to reform its rules and regu-
lations aimed at making the institution more transparent. In simple terms: while
ICSID has tried to increase the public disclosure of the awards and decisions,
those reforms have not been followed by a consistent reduction in secrecy over
time.
168. The coefficients for the Additional Facility are negative and statistically significant at con-
ventional levels as reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.
169. These predictions were calculated from the estimates in Column 1, varying the onset year
of Reform while holding all other variables constant at their means.
170. This figure is reproduced from Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 20.
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From this graph and our statistical analysis, we can see a correlation but
we cannot, of course, distinguish whether this finding is causal. It is impossible
from this study to know whether reform efforts have somehow backfired, in-
creasing the benefits of secrecy to parties in dispute over time or whether this
trend simply reflects ICSID's growing efforts to respond to an inevitable trend
towards secrecy. While we cannot determine whether ICSID reformns have had
any impact, we can conclude that the overall probability of secrecy has not de-
clined over time despite the efforts and expectations.
2. Asymmetric Information and Power
Table 1 above provides only mixed evidence for the role of asymmetric
information and power. Contrary to our expectations, neither the respondent
government's GDP nor their dependence on FDI are significant predictors of
either secrecy or settlement.
However, claimants headquartered in wealthier countries are more likely
to engage in secret arbitration and to be involved in cases that settle, whether
publicly or privately. 171 Tis may reflect that claimants from these countries are
trying to use their position of power to keep more information secret-and per-
haps they have greater means, such as through counsel, in finding ways to do
that. But it may reflect an array of other factors as well, such as variation in the
quality of cases brought-giving one party a strong incentive to settle before a
final award. We look more closely at possible impacts on case quality below
when we discuss litigiousness.
17 1. The coefficients for GDPC (Log) reported in Columns 1 and 2 are positive and statistically
significant at conventional levels.
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3. Avoiding Audience Costs
The statistical analysis reported in Table 1 suggests that the logics leading
to avoidance of the public eye are strongly at work. First, historical experiences
matter in ways that suggest parties are worried about reputation. Respondent
states are much more likely to be parties to secret cases when they have previ-
ously experienced public LossesR, even when takin into consideration the
number of past PublicCaseSR they have experienced. I c a
The statistical effects are quite substantial. A state with no previous expe-
rience of losing has less than a one in five probability of a secret proceeding. A
state with two previous public losses is likely to be a party to a case with a se-
cret outcome about half of the time, whereas a state that has lost four or more
past public cases is predicted to engage in secret arbitration nearly all of the
time. 1 This suggests that while a few governments may prefer to publicize a
likely loss, most seek to conceal their defeat, potentially in order to reduce the
reputational and material harm from losing again.
We also evaluate the relationship between past public losses and settle-
ment in Column 2 of Table 1. We find that respondents with previous public
losses are both more likely to engage in secret arbitration and also statistically
more likely to settle cases. It is plausible that states that have experienced the
financial and reputational consequences of a visible loss would prefer a certain
private settlement to a risky public loss. It is possible that firms are constantly
assessing whether countries are good hosts for investments, an assessment that
can be influenced by information about whether arbitrators have found the
country to be in violation of its obligations. Hence, concerns about audience
costs and reputation may also point in the direction of settlement.
Of course, there could be many other factors at work. For example, a few
governments might prefer transparency in the face of many historical losses in
order to claim, with domestic political audiences in mind, that international in-
stitutions are biased against them. Governments that have a contested relation-
ship with ICSID and other international organizations may be in such posi-
tion. 174 However, these situations are probably rare. For most governments, the
prospect of losing creates incentives for secrecy due to fear of a decrease in
FDI that may follow from visibly losing cases. 7 Settlement is one way of
achieving such goals.
172. The coefficient for LossesR reported in Column I is negative and statistically significant at
conventional levels.
173. These predictions were calculated from the estimates in Column 1, varying the value of
LossesR while holding all other variables constant at their means.
174. Examples of this behavior could include Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela, all countries
that have been the subject of many ICSID disputes. Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of
ICSID in Latin America, 16 LAW & Bus. REv. A. 409, 410 (2010).
175. In fact, the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings was initially defended by states acting
as respondents in an attempt to keep their governments' reputations unaffected by investment disputes.
See Amco Asia Corp. v. Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Request for Provisional
Measures of December 9, 1983, 24 1.L.M. 365 (1985); see also Metalclad Corporation v. Mex., ICSID
Case No. ARB/(AF)/97/1, Decision on a Request by the Respondent for an Order Prohibiting the Claim-
ant from Revealing Information Regarding ICSID Case (Oct. 27, 1997) (granting Mexico's request to
the tribunal to issue an order declaring that the proceedings were confidential).
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When we constrain the analysis (Column 3) to only the subset of cases
with secret outcomes, the coefficient for past Losses remains negative but falls
out of conventional statistical significance-the growing standard error likely
reflects the scarcity of this data subsample for which we relied on 132 observa-
tions.
Second, the results reported in Table 1 above, and illustrated graphically
in Figure 5 below, also suggest that secrecy is a function of the kinds of in-
vestment under dispute.1 76 LongLived investments in highly regulated indus-
tries (shown in black), such as rail, mining and hydrocarbon, are more likely to
conclude in secrecy and in settlement. In fact, the parties to long-lived disputes
are nearly twice as likely to conceal the outcome of arbitration as the parties to
disputes over investments that are short-lived. In these types of cases, we be-
lieve, it is in the interest of both parties to conceal the results in order to reduce
incentives for public posturing that can lead to breakdowns in negotiations.









01 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
Long Lived Investments Short Lived Investments
However, in our constrained analysis (Column 3), cases appear no more
prone to be held secret through the mechanism of settlement than through the
176. In order to create this figure, we re-estimated Equation I to include fixed effects for the
type of industry and exclude LongLived This allows us to ensure, in particular, that countries with high
numbers of public losses are not differentially attracting long-lived investment. This figure is reproduced
from Hafner-Burton et al., Predictability versus Flexibility, at 436 fig.4.
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decision to conceal the award. 177 This may reflect the still small (statistically)
number of cases handled at ICSID or the fact that unlike in national legal sys-
tems, it is relatively easy to allow a case to run to completion and yet keep the
main outcomes essentially secret. For now, our dataset reveals both patterns at
work-the running of cases to their conclusion and settlement-but as the ex-
perience at ICSID rapidly accumulates this proposition should soon be more
reliably testable statistically.
Finally, we find that anti-corruption institutions also predict against se-
crecy. Investments that occur in settings where the relevant countries have tak-
en steps to reduce corruption-such as by respondent states being parties to the
OECD Convention-are those with less damning information to be held from
public view. However, while cases brought against respondent governments
that are parties to the OECD Convention are significantly less likely to be kept
secret, among those subset of cases that are hidden from public view (Column
3), they are more likely to be kept secret through settlement.
4. Litigiousness
The analysis reported in Table 1 suggests that more litigious claimants are
also more likely to prefer secrecy and to prefer to attain secrecy through settle-
ment.17 9 For an average case, the predicted probability of secret arbitration var-
ies across levels of litigious behavior by claimants. A litigious investor filing
four or more cases over time is predicted to be a party to secret arbitration more
than half of the time. By contrast, investors that bring only a single case over
time, on average, are predicted to be a party to a secret case only a quarter of
the time. 180 The use of settlement in such cases is also statistically significant.
Highly litigious claimants are more likely to engage in secrecy and are more
likely to conceal the results of arbitration through settlement.
This outcome may reflect that litigious firms use the filing of a case as a
means of signaling resolve. By this logic, the classic view of investor-state arbi-
tration-as a mechanism of last resort to be used only after all other remedies
have been exhausted-may be too narrow for some claimants. For repeat play-
ers, the greatest value lies in filing cases since, we believe, simply launching a
case-an act that is publicly visible as all cases are registered openly by
ICSID-may help to force the respondent to agree on new terms for the in-
vestment. By contrast, firms that bring just one case in their lifetime will be
more likely to choose the best case from their portfolio of grievances and to use
that case as a mechanism for obtaining reparation for actions that undermine
their investment. Overall, however, settlement is an efficient means of achiev-
ing a desired outcome at the cost of the public good of transparency.
177. While the coefficient for LongLived in Column 3 is positive, it is not a statistically signifi-
cant predictor.
178. The coefficients for BriberYR and Briberyc reported in Column I are negative and statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels.
179. The coefficients for Litigious reported in Columns 1 and 3 are all positive and statistically
significant at conventional levels.
180. These predictions were calculated from the estimates in Column 1, varying the value of
Litigiousc while holding all other variables constant at their means.
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In summary, our analytical framework guides us to evaluate how secrecy
and settlement are historically related and are associated with rules of disclo-
sure, bargaining asymmetries, as well as other private incentives such as con-
cerns for privacy, audience costs, or reputation. Most cases that are kept secret
are done so through settlement. Cases where rules push toward disclosure are in
some circumstances less likely to engage in secrecy and in other circumstances
perhaps even more likely. On the other hand, cases that involve long-lived,
highly regulated industries favor secrecy-we speculate that this is because
keeping those investments viable may require deal making on terms that both
investors and host countries will prefer to keep secret. Disputes that involve re-
spondents with a visible history of losses are also associated with secrecy since
these governments are prone to want to avoid another public loss. Finally, liti-
gious firms will often choose secrecy since conspicuously losing bad cases
would undermine the central value of litigation to business strategy: to manipu-
late perception and gain favorable terms for litigious investors. Once the deci-
sion has been made to keep a case secret, highly litigious claimants in particular
are more likely to conceal arbitral results through settlement.
V. SECRECY AND SETTLEMENT IN ACTION: THREE CASE STUDIES
Part IV demonstrated that there are systematic patterns in secrecy and that
in a large fraction of those cases the parties obtain secrecy through settlement.
The strength of the analysis is the ability to identify robust, systematic patterns.
A weakness is the dependence on variables that are difficult to construct, meas-
ure, and use to infer relationships. To complement our statistical analysis, we
explore three case studies-each of which focuses on a different underlying in-
centive-allowing us to look more closely at the factors at work and illustrate
in real-life scenarios the incentives parties face.
The first case study focuses on one of the most litigious claimant in our
database-the Italian construction firm Impregilo, which has operations
worldwide. It reveals the interaction between litigiousness-which helps the
firm signal resolve in all the countries where it does business-and other pres-
sures on the firm such as the ongoing desire to do business in the country it is
suing, in casu Argentina. The second case focuses in closer detail on privacy
and the kinds of costly information that can be revealed during arbitration-
hence the incentives to settle cases privately. This case concerns efforts by a
German firm, Siemens, to recover a lost investment also in Argentina. Along
the way, an investigation revealed corruption in the original contract and that,
in turn, put Siemens into legal jeopardy. The third case study focuses on gas
infrastructures in Bangladesh and looks at the power dynamics and messy bar-
gains that are necessary to keep Chevron, a powerful claimant, focused on the
management of long-lived and highly regulated investments.
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A. Litigiousness: Impregilo Multiple Claims Sustaining New Investment
Salini-Impregilo, an Italian-based large infrastructure conglomerate that is
one of Europe's largest engineering and general contracting groups, specializes
in water and sewerage, and environmental management.' 8 The firm has a large
overseas business, and like most in the industry it seeks to protect its invest-
ments through investment contracts that often contain clauses assigning juris-
diction to ICSID and/or by ensuring that the investment is protected by a BIT.
In the history of ICSID, this firm has brought seven cases, five of which
were discontinued pursuant to Arbitration Rules 43(1) or 44. 182 In spite of its
history of litigiousness, Salini-Impregilo has continued operations in all of the
five countries it brought before ICSID tribunals: Argentina, Pakistan, United
Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Jordan. 183 The company is skilled at protecting
its interests through arbitration-which plausibly sends a signal to future re-
spondents in other governments-but it is also skilled at not alienating its hosts
with the claims. The case study here looks at how those tensions are managed,
and at why secrecy and settlement can help the firm in that process.
Two of Impregilo's recent cases involved Argentina and are revealing of
the usefulness of investor-state arbitration for a multinational corporation. In
the first case, Argentina was found liable in a water-concession dispute.' 84
Like many ICSID cases involving Argentina, the core of the dispute rests on
the failure to honor contracts when the country's financial crisis undermined
the ability of public agencies to raise funds and pay tariffs for infrastructure
that foreign investors had installed and operated. In this particular case, a 2011
award by an ICSID tribunal determined that Argentina breached the fair and
equitable treatment obligation under the Argentina-Italy BIT. Moreover, Ar-
gentina was ordered to pay Impregilo some twenty-one million U.S. dollars
plus interest as compensation, the amount originally invested by Impregilo.185
In October 2008, while the water-concession claim was still pending be-
fore the tribunal, Impregilo brought a second case, involving the construction
and highway concession in the province of C6rdoba. Again, the financial crisis
had changed the economic facts on the ground. The claimant filed the case at
181. The company was formally known as Impregilo S.p.A. and, through mergers with different
companies, including Salini Costruttori S.p.A, it has reached its current form.
182. Five of the cases were brought by Impregilo and two by Salini. See, e.g., Impregilo S.p.A
v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/03, Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding (Sept. 25, 2005)
(Claimant had, for itself and on behalf of Ghazi-Barotha Contractors (GBC), agreed to "withdraw, dis-
continue and terminate all claims and disputes against the Respondent before ICSID on a 'with prejudice
basis,"' after reaching settlement and payment.).
183. See Worldwide, SALINI [MPREGLLO, http://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/group/
worldwide.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
184. Impregilo was an indirect minority shareholder in Aguas de la Gran Buenos Aires
(AGBA), a company that operated a water and sewage services concession. Shortly after AGBA ob-
tained the concession in 1999, and partly as a result of Argentina's financial crisis, the concessionaire
struggled to raise financing and to collect fees needed to meet its contractual obligations to expand and
improve water and sanitation services in the concession area.
185. An Annulment Committee confirmed this decision in January of 2014. Impregilo S.p.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application
for Annulment (Jan. 24, 2014).
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ICSID after negotiations over adjusting the terms of the concession failed. Af-
ter the tribunal was constituted, the parties settled the case. The settlement
agreement, now published by a Decree, reveals very favorable terms for the
province. Trumpeted in C6rdoba and Argentina as a victory, the settlement al-
lowed the province to take back control of the concession at a fraction of the
amount requested by Impregilo in the case it had filed at ICSID.186
Behind the scenes, however, the settlement revealed a different relationship
between the claimant and respondent-parties that spent endless efforts negoti-
ating in such a way that their mutual dependence could continue. The Italian
company had a long tradition and presence in Argentina and was keen to main-
tain operations. Argentina had limited access to capital and knew the im-
portance of a mutually beneficial solution as its own macroeconomic troubles
as well as alienation of other foreign investors narrowed the country's options.
While the parties have never officially confirmed any connection between these
events, to officials knowledgeable of the issue,' 87 the subsequent $473 million
contract with Argentina's water utility Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos S.A.
awarded to Impregilo came as no surprise. The contract involved a twelve-
kilometer so-called underwater effluent diffuser as part of a remediation plan
for the Matanza-Riachuelo basin in Buenos Aires.' 88 The initiative has signifi-
cant value and was the first part of a wider program, financed by the World
Bank, for sustainable development aimed at the environmental restoration of
the Riachuelo River, considered among the most polluted in the world.189
While the settlement of the Cordoba case allowed Argentina to boast its strate-
gic and negotiating skills, the quiet settlement allowed Impregilo to maintain
operations in a strategically important market and allowed Argentina to re-
access financing from the WBG.
What is most interesting about this case is to observe how Impregilo's liti-
giousness is central to its strategic use of investor-state arbitration. It has filed
costly cases against Argentina to signal resolve-that signaling process made
the filing of the dispute public but allowed Impregilo to keep the detailed out-
comes more secret. This logic, along with other factors, led to a settlement. By
bringing different cases sequentially Impregilo gained critical leverage against
186. The settlement agreement also mandated the discontinuance of the case before ICSID,
which was duly filed pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(1). Aprobaci6n del Convenio de Com-
praventa de Acciones y Reestructuraci6n de Pasivos entre la Provincia de C6rdoba y las Empresas Im-
pregilo International Infrastructures N.V., IGLYS S.A. y Caminos de las Sierras S.A. [Approval of the
Agreement for the Sale of Shares and Restructuring of Liabilities between the Province of Cordoba and
the Companies Impregilo Internatioal Infrastructures N.V., IGLYS S.A. and Caminos de las Sierras
S.A.] of June 23, 2010, Law No. 9799, http://web2.cba.gov.ar/web/leyes.nsf/85a69a56 1f9ea43d0325
7234006a8594/ea95bl 21 d6634dle03257bab0050f90c0penDocument (Arg).
187. Telephone Interview with Argentine Official (Jan. 16, 2015).
188. See Matanza-Riachuelo Basin Sustainable Development Adaptable Lending Program,
World Bank, http://projects.worldbank.org/Pl05680/matanza-riachuelo-basin-mrb-sustainable-
development-adaptable-lending-program?lang-en (last visited May 1, 2017); Restructuring Paper on a
Proposed Project Restructuring, WORLD BANK, Report No. RES26835 (Mar. 3, 2017),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/13058149198231951 1/text/RES26835-Pl05680-PUBLIC-
Restructuring-Paper-Pl05680-2017-03-24-10-16.txt.





Argentina. With a costly public defeat under her belt, Argentina could not risk
another unfavorable award, creating stronger incentives for Argentina to settle
as well. Compared with the status quo, settlement improved the welfare of both
parties. Impregilo obtained a new business opportunity, and avoided a second
costly case, especially because negotiations with the government had already
revealed that, win or lose, Impregilo would have a hard time collecting much
compensation. Argentina avoided risking the loss in reputation and monetary
expense of another public award and obtained new foreign investment at a crit-
ical time. Certainly, the litigious behavior of Impregilo did not singularly cause
the settlement, but it contributed centrally to the logic that led the parties to set-
tle. Put differently, settlement is a tool that allows firms and host countries to
manage their exposure to risk-to maximize the benefits from existing invest-
ments while preserving options for further interactions. While the details of
every investor and case are unique, the use of arbitration and settlement for risk
management by Salini-Impregilo shows how global firms may look at investor-
state arbitration holistically rather than as a set of one-off disputes.
B. Avoiding Audience Costs: Siemens and a Corruption Investigation
Our next case also takes place in the context of Argentina's severe eco-
nomic crisis of 2001, which resulted in widespread public discontent that re-
sulted in emergency economic measures by the government.'90 From the per-
spective of foreign investors, these measures had grave impacts on the value,
expectations, and legal security of their investments in Argentina. In fact, the
measures resulted in the greatest number of investor-state claims against a sin-
gle state, including the first ever mass arbitration (brought by 180,000 Italian
holders of Argentine bonds).1 91 In particular, Siemens brought a proceeding al-
leging that Argentina's actions breached the Argentina-Germany BIT affecting
the value of a large national identity card contract with the central government.
The ICSID tribunal found that Argentina's actions over the course of the crisis
constituted a "creeping" or regulatory expropriation and a violation of the fair
and equitable treatment obligation of the referred treaty. Siemens, after five
years of legal dispute, won a hefty arbitral award of $217 million in 2007 that it
initially kept secret. At the time, this was only the third decision condemning
Argentina to pay damages after the measures adopted during the economic cri-
sis. However, four more adverse decisions against Argentina were expected to
be released that same year and a dozen tribunals had ascertained jurisdiction
190. Martin Feldstein, Argentina's Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis, 81 FOREIGN
AFF. 8 (2002) (noting that among other measures, the "corralito" included limits on cash withdrawals
from bank accounts and prohibitions on transfers of funds out of the country, as well as the "pesifica-
tion" abolishing the pre-existing convertibility regime).
191. Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 41, 44
(2004). For a list of pending cases, see List of Pending Cases, Int'l Centre For Settlement Investment
Disp., http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtisRH
&actionVal=ListPending (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). For a list of concluded cases, see List of Conclud-
ed Cases, Int'l Centre For Settlement Investment Disp.,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=GenCaseDtisRH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last visited Aug. 21, 2017).
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over further investor claims-many adopting a flexible reading on the condi-
tions for investors to escape local litigation requirements.192 The onslaught of
arbitrations and awards was so large that investors began to question whether
Argentina would be able to cover its obligations or even remain within ICSID.
Shortly after the arbitral decision was issued, authorities in Germany and
the United States discovered that Siemens had engaged in acts of systematic
bribery around the world, including in Argentina. The issue of corruption never
arose during the ICSID proceedings. However, as recounted by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice in the Notice of Designation under the FCPA statute, the $1
billion contract procured through bribery, triggered:
[an] arbitration between Siemens and the Argentine government... [but] Siemens
did not assert or imply during the arbitration that the project was tainted by corrup-
tion, despite the confidential record to the contrary ... .1
In other words, while the lawyers representing Argentina before ICSID
may or may not have had knowledge of the corruption (although some Argen-
tine officials certainly knew), Siemens had full knowledge of such events prior
to the issuance of the award-and was therefore obligated to disclose this fact.
Keeping the ICSID award secret facilitated a larger effort by Siemens to keep
its embarrassing corruption in Argentina from view.
Later in 2008 Siemens was forced to disclose the revelations to the U.S.
and German authorities and eventually made public the arbitral award. Howev-
er, this happened only after the company began its own internal investigation
into the matter and started negotiations with the U.S. (and German) authorities
about a potential settlement of the FCPA investigation. Once aware of the cor-
ruption scandal, Argentina petitioned the ICSID tribunal for a "revision" under
Article 51(1) of the ICSID Convention on the grounds that the new evidence on
corruption should decisively affect the outcome of the case. The revision pro-
cedure was never resolved.1 94
The parties' decision to discontinue the proceeding was perhaps based
upon a broader reputational concern by Siemens' and Argentina's preference to
resolve the conflict without paying the award. Interestingly, the choice of set-
tlement, after Siemens had been found in violation of corruption through other
legal processes, reveals an important counterfactual that is rarely available to
scholars. Without the corruption scandal, Argentina and Siemens probably
would have kept the case secret, or Argentina might have revealed the outcome
to underscore an ICSID bias against it. This reveals some of the broader public
benefits that could arise from a more transparent process of arbitration. Trans-
parency would have reduced the incentives to submit false information and in-
creased the opportunities for legal accountability. While the acts of corruption
192. Sylvia Noury, Latin America: Another ICSID Arbitration Against Argentina Passes the
Jurisdictional Hurdle, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REv. 42 (2006).
193. Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Siemens S.A. (Argentina), No. 08-368-RJL
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2008).
194. It is now widely known that Siemens settled with U.S. and German authorities, paying
nearly $1.6 billion in penalties, and discontinued the revision proceeding before ICSID, foregoing the
arbitration award. See Eric Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/1 6siemens.html.
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were revealed elsewhere, Siemens invoked settlement to save face while Ar-
gentina accepted it to walk away from paying damages. In other words, settle-
ment may be optimal in some cases to reduce audience cost.
C. Asymmetric Information and Power: Chevron in a Highly Regulated
Industry
In the 1990s the Indian economy began to grow rapidly, as did the coun-
try's demand for energy.' 95 Seeing this, a wide array of foreign firms, including
(then) Unocal, sought ways to supply the country's fuel and electricity. For
Unocal, that meant producing natural gas, a resource that was thought scarce in
India but abundant in neighboring Bangladesh from which it could be piped
west into the Indian market, where users were willing to pay higher prices.' 96
Working with other partners, Unocal acquired three major exploration blocks in
Bangladesh and began drilling for gas.
Unocal and Petrobangla, a Bangladeshi state-owned company, entered in-
to a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in 1995 and subsequently entered into
several Gas Purchase and Sale Agreements (GPSA). Because it had its eyes on
Indian prizes, Unocal carefully designed its contracts to give it flexibility in
where it sold the gas so long as it paid Petrobangla a transit fee. The contract
between the two companies included provisions referring disputes to ICSID. In
addition, Unocal incorporated its investment into a series of Bermuda-based
companies-allowing ICSID arbitration under the U.K.-Bangladesh BIT. This
approach was standard in the industry at the time where the use of offshore in-
corporation and BITs with mandatory arbitration were seen as a tool for "risk
engineering" that could help foreign investors lower risk and insulate them-
selves from the vagaries of local politics and contractual enforcement.
Political relations between India and Bangladesh soured just as these new
gas supplies were being produced; the option of piping gas to the lucrative In-
dian market vanished. That left Unocal-which Chevron bought in 2005 large-
ly because of the firm's global gas production business-no serious option but
to sell the gas to Petrobangla (its only customer in Bangladesh). Because the
Bangladesh economy was weaker, demand was lower and the state firm had a
monopoly on bulk purchases this meant much lower prices for Chevron.
Meanwhile, Chevron kept finding and producing more gas and became Petro-
bangla's largest supplier. (Once a firm sets up operations to search for hydro-
carbons, it usually finds resources not just in its target search area, but also in
adjacent fields. Indeed, the business model for firms such as Chevron is based
on the assumption that it is skilled at expanding its resource base and leverag-
195. Rahul Tongia & V.S. Arunachalam, Natural Gas Imports for South Asia: Pipelines or
Pipedreams?, 34 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1054, 1055 (May 1, 1999).
196. Martha Olcott, International Gas Trade in Central Asia: Turlnenistan, Iran, Russia, and
Afghanistan, in NATURAL GAS AND GEOPOLITICS: FROM 1970 To 2040, at 202 (David G. Victor, Amy
M. Jaffe & Mark H. Hayes eds., 2006).
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ing increased returns to scale.) 197 Both sides were mutually dependent on each
other in a long-lived, capital-intensive venture to produce, pipe and sell gas.
After Chevron had sunk considerable capital in the project, Petrobangla
began charging Chevron a four percent transit fee on gas sold to Petrobangla
(not to India) and transmitted through Petrobangla's pipelines. Chevron disput-
ed that the transit fee was inappropriate to apply in this context since the fee
had been designed just for exported gas. 198 Unable to reach a resolution on the
matter, Chevron continued to pay the tariff but threatened with arbitration.1 99
Chevron believed the fee was in breach of the GPSA and unfairly affected its
investment.200 By the time Chevron brought a case against Bangladesh before
ICSID in April 2006, the firm had invested more than US$850 million in the
gas fields. 20 1
In the face of many legal difficulties, Chevron sought help via the U.S.
202Embassy in Dhaka. A cable dated August 6, 2007 revealed that the President
of Chevron Bangladesh, Steve Wilson, met with Bangladesh's Energy Secre-
tary and Petrobangla's President in the summer of 2007, both of whom ex-
pressed to Wilson a desire to settle the situation.203 For its part, the U.S. Em-
bassy began to bring attention to the dispute by publicly and privately citing the
Chevron-Petrobangla case as an example of Bangladesh's negative treatment
to foreign investors.204 Fortuitously for us as scholars, but not for Chevron or
the United States government, a trove of official documents recounting these
meetings and efforts were leaked to the Wikileaks site-allowing insight into
197. Peter A. Nolan & Mark C. Thurber, On the State's Choice of Oil Company: Risk Manage-
ment and the Frontier of the Petroleum Industry, in OIL AND GOVERNANCE: STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES AND THE WORLD ENERGY SUPPLY (David G. Victor, David Hults & Mark C. Thurber
eds., 2012).
198. U.S. Embassy Dhaka, Chevron's International Arbitration, WIKILEAKS (Aug. 6, 2007),
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07DHAKAl 265_a.html.
199. In fact, according to the file, Chevron continued to pay without further communication
until 2003 when a second GPSA was signed, followed by a third in 2004 whose language regarding the
transit fee modeled the first agreement. See Chevron Bangladesh Block Twelve Ltd. and Chevron Bang-
ladesh Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen, Ltd. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/1 0.
200. M.I. Farooq, Sajed Sami & Taslima Yasmin, Impact of International Arbitration Proceed-
ing: Governmental Approach and Investment Climate in Bangladesh 34 (Inv. Climate Series, Econ. Re-
search Group Working Paper No. 1, 2010), https://www.ergonline.org/ifc/document/ERG%20WP%201-
2010.pdf.
201. Id. at 33.
202. The executives at Chevron emphasized that it was not seeking help with the merits of the
case, but rather to ensure that the proper process was followed to bring the case before ICSID. U.S. Em-
bassy Dhaka, supra note 198, 1 4.
203. U.S. Embassy Dhaka, supra note 198. However, both officials felt powerless to settle the
lawsuit given the country's current anti-corruption environment for fears that it would appear that they
were paid off by Chevron. However, Chevron expressed its concern that the high profile of Petro-
bangla's attorney would impede an amicable settlement for fears of accusations of impropriety and brib-
ery. U.S. Embassy Dhaka, Action Request in Chevron/Petrobangla Arbitration, WIKILEAKS, ¶ 6, (Aug.
16, 2007), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07DHAKAl 349_a.html.
204. U.S. Embassy Dhaka, supra note 198. For example, in a September 2007 meeting between
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State for South and Central Asian Affairs John Gastright and
the Chief Advisor in Bangladesh, Gastright stated that Chevron's ongoing dispute with Petrobangla
could affect investor confidence, to which the Chief Advisor promised to look into the situation. U.S.
Embassy Dhaka, DAS Gastright Urges Bangladesh Caretaker Government to Stick to the Road Map,
WIKILEAKS (Sept. 26, 2007), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07DHAKAl569_a.html.
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the inner workings of a case that otherwise would have been shrouded in secre-
cy.
For purposes of this Article, the Chevron case reveals two interesting
things. First, the official ruling in the case was unexpected and created larger
fears for the whole industry of firms that depended upon access to government-
controlled pipelines to market their gas. In May 2010, the ICSID tribunal ruled
in favor of Bangladesh. Interestingly, Petrobangla was not forced to repay past
transit fees nor to stop charging them in the future, totaling an estimated worth
of US$400 million.205 The unexpected win may help explain why news of the
outcome leaked immediately in the local press,206 thus affording us a rare op-
portunity to look at an outcome that was supposed to remain secret. The parties
never agreed to release the award publicly and thus ICSID, to this day, has is-
sued only minor details. The huge implications for firms in similar positions
explain why this leak was soon picked up by the international oil and gas
press.207 For Bangladesh, the good news would have played well locally. For
Chevron, whose audience costs were now greater following this loss, silence
remained the rule.208 For the broader public, including the future investor
community, the case holds information that could be invaluable in developing
appropriate expectations about the benefits from oil and gas exploration, as
well as expectations around how panels would rule on complex yet ubiquitous
challenges in setting transit fees.
Second, as with Impregilo's investments in Argentina, while the particu-
lar dispute affected the allocation of the rents from gas production in Bangla-
desh, it appears to have had little impact on the ongoing business relationships
between the investor and the host country. In the midst of the arbitration, for
example, Chevron kept investing in exploration for more gas, leading in 2009
to the biggest gas find in Bangladesh in a decade. 209 Within three years, the
company announced $500 million in new investments to produce this newly
discovered gas. 210 In parallel, in 2010, Petrobangla announced that it would use
its own money to construct a 100 km pipeline worth US$250 million to move
these new Chevron-produced gas resources into the Bangladesh market.211 We
interpret this ongoing investment as a sign that the traditional rule allowing par-
ties to keep process and outcomes secret at no cost can be relaxed with conse-
205. M. Azizur Rahman, Pipeline Construction Underway to Take Gas from Chevron Fields,
F[N. ExPRESS (Aug. 14, 2010), http://print.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/more.php?news id=108965&
date=2010-08-14&utm source=feedbumer&utm medium=feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+
thefinancialexpress-bd%2FlouH+%28The+Financial+Express%29.
206. Petrobangla Set to Allow Chevron Install Gas Compression Station, FIN. EXPRESS (Aug.
24, 2009), http://print.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/2009/08/24/77056.html.
207. Chevron Loses Fight Over Costs, UPSTREAM (May 28, 2010),
http://www.upstreamonline.com/hardcopy/news/966956/chevron-loses-fight-over-costs.
208. The company never issued a press release nor a public filing for its investors on the out-
come that would have been worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
209. Bangladesh: Chevron Makes Major New Gas Find, ENERGY-PEDIA (Sept. 23 2009),
http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/bangladesh/chevron-makes-major-new-gas-find.
210. Press Release, Chevron, Chevron to Expand Bangladesh Natural Gas Project (July 30,
2012), https://www.chevron.com/stories/chevron-to-expand-bangladesh-natural-gas-project.
211. Rahman, supra note 205.
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quences that are much smaller than originally feared when this secrecy-
favoring system of arbitration was established.
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE? A NEW STRATEGY FOR ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY
Despite massive reforms aimed at boosting transparency in ICSID, strong
incentives remain for many parties to favor secrecy. And the parties have
found, mainly through settlement, the means for obtaining secret outcomes. For
those concerned with the use of investor-state arbitration for the erosion of the
public domain and imposing social cost, the message seems clear: there is a
need for a 'public law' approach to settlements.212
Here we offer a roadmap for how governments and other important actors
can improve the situation. First, we suggest expanding the transparency debate
to include explicit attention to settlements. This will help create a more solid
foundation among scholars and practitioners for improving transparency in m-
ternational economic law. Second, we make the case that there should be a pre-
sumption against secrecy in investor-state arbitration settlements, recognizing
that there are conditions under which this presumption could be relaxed. Third,
we briefly outline the elements of a policy reform toolkit.
As a more general point, we note that over recent decades international
lawyers and political scientists have been working together more closely. One
of the chief advances from that collaboration has been to reveal how incentives
affect the content of legal instruments. Adopting a similar incentive-compatible
approach is essential so that the players that make crucial decisions, such as on
the filing and settling of disputes, behave differently.
A. Expanding the Transparency Debate to Include Settlement
As attention to transparency in international law has risen, most of that
debate has never addressed the role of settlements in investor-state arbitration.
This omission-an error in our view-is partly due to the promotion of the idea
that a key function of international courts and tribunals (including ICSID tribu-
nals) is to help contestants settle their disputes before engaging in costly formal
procedures, such as litigation and arbitration. While this pro-settlement bias in
adjudicatory institutions would be more controversial in domestic contexts-
especially in the decades since Fiss-the opposite may be true when it comes to
international law. In fact, one could easily argue that nations would be less
willing to surrender sovereignty and agree to the jurisdiction of international
institutions if they could not settle the dispute on their own terms, including
maintaining a desired degree of privacy and confidentiality.
While understandable, this argument misses the mark because of the ex-
panded scope and authority of international law, especially in economic affairs.
While that transformation has come with many important benefits-such as ris-
212. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (coining the term "public law litigation"); see also Harold Koh, The Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization Mission Controversy, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. 534, 550 (1988) (noting the existence of
"transnational public law litigation").
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ing levels of investment, trade, and welfare-it has intrinsically also created
suspicions and distrust. Backroom deals outside the normal realms of political
accountability have amplified those fears and the push against economic inter-
dependence.
How the process of investor-state arbitration actually works now lies at
the center this debate. That is because the parties have found many ways to
keep their arbitration private-even when there are formal requirements for
publication of final awards. Those many ways, notably settlement, we have
documented above. In addition, the scope of investment law-bolstered by in-
terpretations through investor-state arbitration-has expanded markedly. Most
cases are not about expropriation, but rely on expansive interpretation of pro-
tection standards-for example, the concept of "fair and equitable treatment."
These types of vague provisions raise concerns in part because of their potential
impact on domestic regulation.213 Consider, for instance, recent cases brought
under such umbras: claims against Argentina by 180,000 Italian bondholders
who lost value in their investment in sovereign debt;214 a dispute brought by a
Swedish utility that owned nuclear assets in Germany demanded compensation
after the nuclear disaster in Fukushima contributed to Germany's reversal of its
nuclear energy policy; 215 or the controversial cases over labeling requirements
brought by Philip Morris against Uruguay and Australia. 216
It is easy to appreciate how secrecy-notably through settlements in
which the parties agree in private how to dispose a case-has threatened the
legitimacy, and thus, political viability of foreign investment law. Indeed, the
existing caseload that we have studied-statistically for the full sample and in
more depth with three case studies-helps to frame what could become a dele-
gitimizing spiral in investment law and more generally for international legal
rules and institutions that expand in scope and authority.
The delegitimizing mechanism might operate as follows: when states ex-
pect to lose a case, and have no rules towards disclosure, they can keep out-
comes secret by relying on settlement. Those settlements, because they create
consequential yet private information, reinforce the asymmetrical nature of for-
eign investment relations-along with the impression, in the public eye, that
special deals abound. Moreover, large multinational companies that often act as
repeat players in investment disputes have an incentive to skew the case law as
they favor revealing only those decisions that result in investor-friendly inter-
pretations. All other, possibly bad cases, can be either kept secret or settled.
And while more BITs, investment chapters in FTAs, and other instruments that
213. Letter from Elizabeth Warren, United States Senator from Massachusetts, to Michael Fro-
man, United States Trade Representative (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/
documents/TPP.pdf (criticizing ISDS as a mechanism to "challenge U.S. government policies").
214. Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna A. Beccara & Others v. Ar-
gentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, IM 68,
238(i)-(iii) (Aug. 4, 2011).
215. Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, ICS[D Case No. ARB/09/6, Request for Arbitration (Mar. 30, 2009).
216. For yet another controversial dispute, see Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Re-
public of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009) (involving
billions of dollars over an Ecuadorian court's decision regarding environmental damage compensation).
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allow for arbitration require disclosure, many do not; investors can shop for in-
stitutions that make it easier for the private interest of secrecy to dominate the
broader public benefit of more transparent outcomes. As this mechanism pro-
ceeds and accelerates, as has happened since the 1990s with the explosion of
investor-state cases, broader civil society becomes more aware of the conse-
quences yet less able to elucidate their meaning and to engage in shaping the
process.
The debate over transparency in international economic law needs to look
beyond the public benefits of transparency to the mechanisms by which private
incentives influence which information is revealed. That new debate will help
reveal what's at stake with the expansion in scope and authority of international
legal institutions as well as the spirals (upwards and downwards) that will af-
fect public support and commitment. In an era when the legitimacy of intema-
tional legal institutions is under shadow, that debate is overdue.
B. Against Settlement Without Disclosures
As the new debate about transparency unfolds, ideas and evidence will
emerge, and that will improve how the community of scholars and practitioners
attempt to resolve the problem of secrecy-similar to how Fiss helped trigger a
similar debate within national legal systems.
Already, however, it is possible to identify core information that should
be revealed in investor-state arbitration as well as the tradeoffs that will be im-
portant because of the huge differences in the backgrounds of states and other
important players in investor-state arbitration. Failure to reflect those differ-
ences will lead to policies that are sub-optimal and also politically impractical.
Our position is not against settlement because that would remove an important
dispute-resolution tool. Rather, we argue against settlement without disclo-
sures. We build that position by looking first at the information that will need
exposure and then, in the next section, at a toolkit of policy reforms that could
achieve that outcome.
On the side of information, it is documented that in well-functioning legal
systems the public resolution of cases affords accountability and fosters public
debate and confidence in the law.217 While these concepts are appealing in the
abstract, it is unclear what type of information is of relevance and general inter-
est. 2
18
To be sure, investor-state arbitration presents a very different institutional
environment. Unlike areas of domestic law, where judges can oppose settle-
ment terms to protect the public interest or some stakeholders of a proceed-
217. As a court in the United States observed, "[t]he public has an interest in knowing what
terms of settlement a federal judge would approve and perhaps therefore nudge the parties to agree to."
Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002).
218. Domestic experience, however, may offer some guidance. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
23.1 ("A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's
approval. Notice of a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must be given to share-
holders or members in the manner that the court orders.").
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219ing, we do not believe arbitrators should interfere in the parties' right to set-
tle a dispute. In fact, they probably should encourage this process. But arbitra-
tors do need to play more active roles in balancing the parties' privacy and right
to confidential settlements against the benefits of public information-a balanc-
ing process that would be aided by clearer general principles. Perhaps more
ambitious could be empowering adjudicators who know the facts of individual
cases to play more conspicuous guiding roles not just in ruling on the merits of
cases (as they do today) but also on the merits of transparency and confidential-
ity. If the process of determining the scope and intensity of seal were discussed
publicly-as is now common for many domestic settlements-then a body of
expectations and norms around the appropriate degree of settlement transparen-
cy would emerge.
Mindful of those concerns, we provide here a list of relevant information
that we believe should be disclosed with all settlements:
(1) Background of the dispute, including identity of the parties, specific
measure(s) challenged, and legal basis for the dispute;
(2) Information regarding attorneys and arbitrators involved, including
names and firms as well as fees, and expenses in connection to the case;
(3) Preliminary rulings or findings from arbitrators;
(4) Reasons for settlement, including the history of the litigation and the set-
tlement process;
(5) Terms of settlement, including benefits of settlement, obligations of the
parties resulting from settlement, payments provided and pending claims
(if any); and
(6) The existence of any third-party funding contract related to the proceed-
ings as well as the identity of any funder involved during the case.
These minimum disclosure standards are designed to create transparency
around the logic for settlement as well as basic terms. This will allow parties in
potentially similar future cases to develop rational expectations for the juris-
prudence that could lead to settlement, narrowing the information asymmetries
that have been identified as a barrier to efficient settlement. Crucially, it will
allow much more informed public debate. At present, only scattered infor-
mation related to the first, second, and third point on this list can be gleaned
from most public records.
C. Incentive Compatible Reform Strategies: A Flexible Toolkit
How can greater transparency of settlements be achieved while also creat-
ing flexibility to balance the particular interests and context of each case? More
robust answers to this question are long overdue, but implementation is diffi-
cult. Here we offer a preliminary toolkit--ordered from the policy changes that
will be most straightforward to adopt to those that are most profound yet diffi-
219. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, No. 1 I-cv-02509, 2004 WL
3917126, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (rejecting a $324 million settlement as insufficient in a class-
action antitrust case that accused leading high tech firms-Google, Apple, Adobe Systems and Intel-of
colluding not to hire each other's employees, driving down wages for five years).
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cult. We begin with vital reforms at UNCITRAL because they could help orient
the reform process more broadly. We then look at ways to improve best prac-
tices and to promote reform through unilateral action. We end with the most
difficult but ultimately essential reforms that will be needed at ICSID.
1. Enhancing UNCITRAL Reforms
ICSID is just one of several arbitral institutions involved in investor-state
arbitration administration, all of which have different processes, policies and
standards-including on access to information.220 Some arbitral institutions
have been slow to adopt reforms and others see confidentiality as a comparative
advantage, hence it is very difficult to know all the investor-state cases.221 This
raises the specter of complex, overlapping rules222 and allows, in theory, arbi-
tration parties to escape scrutiny if they can shop around for the most attractive
fora. 223
We see the risk of forum shopping as over-stated. There are rigidities in
the selection of forum and intrinsic advantages to ICSID, such as lower fees
and automatic enforceability of awards. If ICSID (which has the largest case-
load) and UNCITRAL (which often helps shape the process of arbitral reform)
both pursue adjustments in settlement-oriented reforms, then fears of forum
shopping will be greatly diminished. Full-blown reform at ICSID-which we
consider below-is hard. But UNCITRAL reforms are closer at hand and could
help experiment with new procedures that then, later, become more widely
adopted, including at ICSID.
The recent efforts taken by reformers offer a model and can be described
as an opt-in system for treaties arising prior to April 1, 2014, and opt-out for
treaties arising on or after that date. This strategy has been simple:
UNCITRAL, a body of the United Nations specializing in commercial law, has
adopted the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (the "Rules on Transparency"). The rules comprise a set of proce-
dural standards that provide for transparency and accessibility to the public of
treaty-based investor-state arbitration. The Rules on Transparency apply in re-
lation to disputes arising out of treaties concluded prior to April 1, 2014, when
Parties to the relevant treaty, or disputing parties, agree to their application.224
220. See generally David Caron, ICSID in the Twenty-First Century: An Interview with Meg
Kinnear, 104 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 413, 427 (2010) (describing ICSID as a business that competes
with other arbitral institutions).
221. Jarrod Wong & Jason W. Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-Related
Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals, and Modest Re-
turns, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009-2010, at 233 (Karl Sauvant
ed., 2010) (arguing that differences in transparency may lead claimants to favor less transparent fora
over ICSID).
222. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Re-
sources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277 (2004) (discussing the "regime complex" as "a collective of partially over-
lapping and nonhierarchical regimes").
223. Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping and Dispute Settlement in In-
ternational Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 735 (2007).
224. See generally Lise Johnson & Nathalie Bemasconi-Osterwalder, New UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next Steps, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT'L
INv. (Aug. 2013), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRALRulesonTransparency-
[Vol. 42:2332
Against Secrecy
The Rules on Transparency apply in relation to disputes arising out of treaties
concluded on or after April 1, 2014 unless the disputing parties otherwise
agree. The Rules on Transparency are also available for use in investor-state
arbitrations initiated under rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
in ad hoc proceedings, and when the respondent state adopts them. The rules
also create a transparency registry for proceedings.
The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules do not apply to ICSID proceedings
unless the parties to the proceedings adopt them. To complement this situation
UNCITRAL has also concluded the multilateral or "Mauritius" Convention on
Transparency as well as the "Unilateral Model Declaration on Transparency."
Both documents can be used by states wishing for the new Rules on Transpar-
ency to apply to disputes arising under BITs concluded before their adoption,
as well as proceedings under other rules, including ICSID Arbitration Rules.
For a state adopting either of these instruments, the effects are clear: it commits
itself to follow the transparency requirement even if the other party to the dis-
pute is not bound by a similar requirement. 225
The UNCITRAL approach, which included ICSID as an active partici-
pant, did not include provisions directly applicable to the publication of settle-
ments. These shortcomings could be alleviated by expanding the scope of the
obligations to include the basic terms of a settlement in the future. An approach
of this nature, through the existing instruments or by negotiating new agree-
ment, avoids the difficulty of renegotiating signed BITs or the ICSID Conven-
tion-two complex and daunting tasks as we explain below.
2. Encouraging Best Practices in Arbitration
In some limited cases, parties to litigation that involved the intervention
of arbitrators made public statements after they settled their disputes. Some of
these disclosures included the terms of the settlement, simply as a matter of
good practice. Arbitrators could adopt a more robust practice in this regard by
counseling the parties to an arbitration proceeding to make public basic terms
of the settlement. This practice could be developed by obtaining the parties'
consent to release the settlement terms or embody such settlement in the form
of an award in the terms of ICSID Rule 43 (or similar provisions under other
arbitration rules). While the parties to the case would still have to consent, re-
questing such consent at the beginning of a case may be plausible, as arbitrators
have some authority to induce parties to follow good practices that may afford
confidence to the system.
Arbitrators should be encouraged to adopt a more proactive role to nudge
parties into releasing settlement information. As a shortage of legitimacy of in-
vestor-state arbitration continues to be a source of anxiety, concerned stake-
holders will keep demanding a public law approach to the process.
commentaryFINAL.pdf (explaining the rules, which include rules on (1) Publication of Documents; (2)
Third-Party Submissions; (3) Submission by a Non-disputing Party to the Treaty; (4) Public Access to
Hearings; (5) Exceptions; and (6) Creation of a Repository of the Published Information).
225. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion, G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Doc. A/68/496 (Dec. 10, 2014, not yet in force).
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3. Adapting BITs
Many NGOs and governments have recognized the broader powers of arbi-
trators and tribunals and have sought reform through the legal instruments that
give authority to ICSID and other institutions. For instance, states, often under
pressure by NGOs (e.g., Center for International Environmental Law), have
been adjusting treaty clauses with new provisions that, inter alia, allow (or re-
quire) open hearings, third-party participation, and non-disputing state party
submissions.226 The same can be said about provisions that allow third-party
governments with a "substantial" or "systemic" interest to deliver written and
oral testimony.227 Moreover, the most modem investment instruments mandate
that governments make available to the public, among others, "orders, awards
and decisions of the tribunal." 228
So far, however, none of the major model BITs has focused on reforming
the rules around settlement. They have all focused, to varying degrees, on the
arbitral process and on orders, awards and decisions. But the same political
forces within countries that have allowed for reform of those rules could be ap-
plied to settlement-especially if NGOs and others that organize political pres-
sure in favor of more transparency understood the pivotal role of settlement in
their endeavor.
Governments could incorporate clauses demanding the mandatory disclo-
sure of settlements, or even the requirement for the parties to request the tribu-
nal to embody the settlement in an arbitral award, consistent with the terms of
Rule 43 of ICSID Rules of Arbitration (or similar provisions under other arbi-
tration rules). Future BITs could also establish more robust mechanisms in
which parties to a dispute are obligated to notify the terms of a settlement. This
approach, similar to the current WTO system (where solutions mutually ac-
ceptable to the parties must also be reported),229 could render special benefits in
future multilateral agreements.
This solution may take a long time, given the thousands of BITs already
in effect. But early efforts in a few key states can illustrate and experiment with
public law approaches to settlement and will help those practices spread-just
as reforms to the model BIT in the United States and other countries have led to
226. Sergio Puig & Meg Kinnear, NAFTA Chapter Eleven at Fifteen: Contributions to a
Systemic Approach in Investment Arbitration, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 225, 259-61 (2010)
(discussing the evolution of the transparency debate under NAFTA and how it influenced other invest-
ment agreements); see also 2004 U.S. Model BIT arts. 28-29 (access by non-disputing state to proceed-
ings, including a right to commentary on draft awards); 2012 U.S. Model BIT arts. 28-29 (same); Chris-
tina Knahr, Transparency, Third Party Participation and Access to Documents in International
Investment Arbitration, 23 ARB. INT'L 327, 328 (2007) (explaining the lack of a codified process for
amicus curiae participation in NAFTA tribunals under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules); Lydia Lazar,
NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Secret Corporate Weapon?, 6 J. GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS 49 (2000); Loukas
A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, 21 ARB. INT'L 211, 221-23 (2005) (noting
that "amicus curiae briefs" are not always welcome by tribunals).
227. BENJAMIN MILLER ET AL., GUIDE FOR POTENTIAL AMIC IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2014), http://ciel.org/Publications/GuidePotentialAmiciFullJan2014.pdf.
228. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 9.24(1), Jan. 26, 2016; see also EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 8.36 (incorporating UNCITRAL transparency
rules).
229. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement art. 9.24(1), Jan. 26, 2016.
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reforms. This approach has the advantage of shifting the burden of monitoring
disclosure of settlements to the governments that are most committed to ex-
panded transparency.
4. Experimenting with Unilateral Actions by States
The modification of BITs-which are agreements between two countries
often modeled on the strong interests of mostly one of them-is a particular
variant of a reform strategy that could be utilized to a greater degree: unilateral
action. Governments, working on their own, could make significant progress.
They could, in effect, force higher standards for disclosure of settlements and
also illustrate practical methods for resolving difficult problems, such as how to
supervise which elements of settlements should be allowed to remain under
seal. While a full-blown analysis of unilateral action is beyond the scope of this
study, we will briefly explain why this approach could be promising.
First, general obligations to report settlements could be included in do-
mestic legislation, regulations, or similar instruments (as some states have done
with respect to other transparency requirements). Already, governments unilat-
erally adopt rules that require public notification of certain information when
they negotiate trade and investment agreements.230 An extension of that ap-
proach could cover settlement disclosures under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) (for the government) or Federal Securities Laws (for the inves-
tor)-two examples that are relevant in the context of U.S. law.231 A robust
practice of gathering information on settlement is consistent with instruments
that support transparency in other areas of international law, including human
rights.232
Second, unilateral experimentation could help identify ways to supervise
settlements. Many legal systems create options allowing for degrees of seal on
settlements by delegating to the courts the authority to supervise competing
private interests (that often cherish secrecy) with public values and interests for
transparency. Doing the same may be complicated in investor-state arbitration,
as it would put arbitrators into new roles that could alter how they perform their
core arbitrating functions and would also be impractical under most current
230. The Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Legislation of 2002 enacted by Congress mandated
the inclusion of safeguards in the mechanisms used to resolve disputes. Similar objectives were reflected
in the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs, the 2003 Canadian Model FlPA and Mexico's subsequent BITs.
231. See Ctr. For Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative, 505 F. Supp. 2d 150,
153-54 (D.D.C. 2007). But see Azmy v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 562 F. Supp. 2d 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that disclosure "would impair [the State Department's] ability to obtain information from for-
eign governments in the future, who will be less likely to cooperate with the United States if they cannot
be confident that the information they provide will remain confidential"). Many countries, including
developing countries, have passed laws equivalent to FOIA; see FREEDOM INFO,
http://www.freedominfo.org (last visited May 1, 2017); Margrete Stevens, The Right to Information and
Investor-State Disputes: the Development ofa New Procedural Framework in NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbi-
trations, Presentation in the Conference "International Economic Disputes-A Wider Perspective," St.
John's College, Cambridge, April 1-3, 2004.
232. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocols Number 11 and Number 14 art. 34, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194; American
Convention on Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; African
Charter on Human and People's Rights arts. 47-54, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
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rules-although we favor moving the system in that direction. States could help
move the system in this direction, however, with a veto or state oversight ap-
proach. This approach gives the home state of the claimant the ability to protect
against policy consequences from certain matters being brought to arbitra-
233tion.
Applied to settlements, this approach would allow the disputing parties to
pre-declare that in the interest of the peaceful settlement of disputes, the disput-
ing parties will not disclose some aspects of the case. If the state of nationality
of the investor does not object to this relaxation of the presumption, then a
'sealed settlement' could proceed accordingly. The host states would have re-
sponsibility to weigh how sealing would affect the public interest-with greater
presumption against secrecy in cases that implicate broader public matters.
The case for unilateral action always sits uneasy in the field of public in-
ternational law-a field anchored in the idea that there are common standards
and practices designed, precisely, to avoid unilateralism. But supportive unilat-
eralism should be welcomed, especially when ideal multilateral reforms, to
which we turn below, are difficult to fathom in the absence of demonstrated ex-
amples and best practices. .
5. Formally Reforming Rules and Procedures (ICSID and others)
Reforming the formal rules at work at ICSID will be difficult, but some
progress is possible by recalling the differences between the ICSID Convention
and ICSID's Rules. The Convention provides that ICSID "shall not publish the
award without the consent of the parties." 234 Changing that standard requires
changing the ICSID Convention. The formal barriers to such an action-for it
to have force between all ICSID members, all 159 Contracting States shall rati-
fy, accept and approve the amendment-renders an amendment highly unlike-
ly. However, the modification of ICSID Rules is plausible, as they require pass-
ing the less hefty bar of a two-thirds approval by the Administrative Council-
a process taking place as this Article goes to press. To this effect, Rule 43 (Set-
tlement and Discontinuance) could add a requirement for the Secretariat to pub-
lish the basic terms of a settlement with the parties' consent. While imperfect,
this feasible option could be the basis for a better institutional practice.
We see such reforms to ICISID's rules as very difficult but practical once
the other elements of our reform toolkit have been allowed to work. Practical
reforms at UNCITRAL along with many examples of better practices-from
new BITs, unilateral action, and improved best practices-will make it much
easier to muster the support needed for formal reforms in ICSID's rules
233. For instance, under the NAFTA, a tax veto applies to fiscal measures in claims of improp-
er expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110. The NAFTA does not suggest that tax matters cannot be
arbitrated. Rather, the treaty says that fiscal authorities in host and investor states together may block the
arbitral proceedings. See William Park, Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA 's Tax Veto, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L.
231 (2001).




Against Settlement is an important contribution to legal scholarship main-
ly because it reminds us of the significant role that transparent adjudication
plays in prompting debate and building the legitimacy of a legal system. The
same concerns that animated Owen Fiss now arise internationally. In this sense,
international economic law may be living its Fissian moment. Like Fiss we are
not against settlements. We also are not arguing against secrecy in all con-
texts-for instance, in the few cases where transparency requirements would
deter the parties in dispute from engaging in formalized adjudication and the
stakes associated with concluding the dispute do not affect the public good, se-
crecy may be warranted. Rather, we are for putting settlement into its proper
(much narrower) role in an evolving legal environment and for promoting more
oversight of settlements along the way.
It is understandable that policy-makers, negotiators, government officials,
NGOs, and other stakeholders have tended to ignore what is, in our view, a
fundamental variable in the debate over the transparency of investor-state arbi-
tration. However, as we have argued, the transformation of international eco-
nomic law demands public law approaches to litigation that can also help legit-
imize the field. Chief among them is addressing the role of settlement in
maintaining secret what otherwise should be visible to the public.
The analysis here has focused on a particular sphere of international prac-
tice-the realm of investor-state arbitration-and statistically we have exam-
ined just one body (ICSID). But the insights have more general applicability in
the realm of international economic law where disputes can create strong pri-
vate incentives for secrecy that run counter to the public benefit of transparen-
cy. While most areas of international economic law do not have a right of ac-
tion for firms, some fora operate in ways that create some resemblance to this
private right of action. When firms are powerful and well-connected to a gov-
ermnent, they may enjoy such rights de facto; similarly, when governments
have firm-initiated processes, such as for anti-dumping actions in the United
States, they create incentives for private actors to initiate disputes. In such set-
tings, the private incentive for secrecy may be particularly high; moreover,
governments themselves may also favor secrecy in the handling of some dis-
putes.
Finally, the concerns about secrecy and settlement we raise here may im-
plicate, as well, the broader sphere of international governance. That discussion
must deal with the fact that firms and civil society actors are playing a bigger
role in the development of international law and the fact that, as law becomes
more intrusive into the realms of national political choice, it will face legitima-
cy challenges. The devices by which the contestants in these processes can alter
transparency, including the mechanism of settlement, need the same kind of
scrutiny that Fiss helped to trigger more than three decades ago within national
law. Global governance today is a system of nation states, increasingly con-
strained in what they can do by international treaties and institutions, and atten-
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tive (we hope) to the larger public benefits that will flow when that system en-
gages the public in transparent ways.
APPENDIX 1
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Secret 372 0.38 0.49 0 1
Settled 372 0.32 0.47 0 1
LongLived 367 0.51 0.50 0 1
LossesR 372 1.02 1.81 0 9
PublicCasesR 372 1.60 2.48 0 13
Litigiousc 372 1.38 0.89 1 5
Reform 372 3.67 3.05 0 11
Additional Facility 372 0.11 0.31 0 1
BriberyR 372 0.22 0.41 0 1
Briberyc 372 0.72 0.45 0 1
GDPR (Log) 370 7.90 1.24 4.70 10.72
GDPc (Log) 368 10.23 0.69 5.57 10.86
PolityR 358 3.55 6.08 -10 10
Polityc 369 9.19 3.11 -10 10
FDIR (Log) 366 0.87 1.13 -2.33 3.97
ArgentinaR 372 0.13 0.33 0 1
ITA 372 0.09 0.28 0 1
Experiencec 372 0.12 0.43 0 4
Corruptionc 283 1.39 0.71 -0.97 2.53
CorruptionR 282 -0.41 0.66 -1.9 1.72
InflationR (Log) 336 2.16 1.17 -1.93 8.24
Nationalityc 312 6.14 2.33 0 9.17
Here, we take several additional steps in an effort to determine the ro-
bustness of the core statistical findings by considering multiple alternative ex-
planations. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the central variables used in
our analysis. Tables 4 and 5 report nine additional tests on Secret and Settle-
ment, respectively. In Columns 1, we include fixed effects for each case and
determine that the findings are consistent. Columns 2 include fixed effects for
time-specifically, the year in which the ICSID panel was constituted. This al-
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lows us to examine the effect of the variables between countries in a given
year. The estimates remain largely consistent.
Columns 3 include a control for investment disputes with Argentina-the
subject of two of our case studies-that accounted for more arbitrations in our
sample than any other host government. This is notably important since the
ICSID caseload has swelled over the last decade due to economic and political
crises in Argentina. Controlling for disputes against Argentina-a clear outli-
er-does not improve the model fit or change the model's substantive results,
though cases against Argentina are more likely to be kept secret.
Columns 4 control for cases we coded from Investment Treaty Arbitration
(ITA) sources rather than ICSID sources to reveal whether our results might
reflect a bias from the organizations that collect investment awards. ICSID's
ability to publish awards on its website reflects not only whether the parties
consent to publication but also perhaps various bureaucratic inefficiencies or
inconsistencies. ITA, by contrast, can draw from a wider array of sources that
might include cases that the parties did not intend to reveal to the public, such
as through leaks; inclusion of that data might lead to a source of bias, although
we see no evidence of that problem in Column 4.
We are not able to evaluate whether a claimant's history of prior public
losses affects the secrecy decision because few claimants in our dataset have
prior public losses. We can, however, evaluate whether a claimant's past histo-
ry of bringing cases, their overall Experiencec, affects their secrecy decisions.
Experiencec -measured here as a count of the claimant's previous disputes in
Columns 5-is negative and statistically insignificant, while all other variables
in the model remain consistent in sign and significance.
In Columns 6 we include additional information on Corruption measured
by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. This measure captures perceptions of
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites
and private interests. Unfortunately, these data are available only beginning in
1996, substantially reducing our sample size. The core findings nonetheless
remain.
In Columns 7 we estimate an alternative indicator for the strength of the
respondent government. Recent work suggests a correlation between inflation
and the occurrence of investor-state arbitration, which may indicate a more
immediate source of weakness than the size of a respondent's GDP. Using
WBG data, we therefore control for the respondent's (log) inflation rate in the
year an arbitration tribunal was constituted, InflationR. Inflation is not a predic-
tor of secrecy-the core findings remain significant.
In line with recent research on the conditions under which governments
can breach contracts with foreign firms, we also include a measure in Column 8
designed to capture the diversity of the nationality of investors, which may af-
fect the capacity of respondent governments to defend themselves. This meas-
ure is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index-a value of 1 means all
of a country's FDI is from one other country and increasing values correspond
to greater diversity. Controlling for this diversity, the main results are again sta-
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tistically significant. Interestingly, as a country's FDI base increases its diversi-
ty, an arbitration outcome is less likely to stay private.
Finally, in Colunm 9 we distinguish those cases that have been settled
through Rule 43 procedures, excluding the small minority that have been set-
tled through Rule 44. All factors that predict settlement more generally also
predict settlement through Rule 43.
Table 3: Predicting Secret Arbitration at ICSID, 1972-2012: Robustness Checks
Ar- Cor- In- Na-
genti- ITA ie- rup- fla- tion- Rul
Case Year na tion tion ality e43
0.94
LongL 0.757* 0.987 0.718* 0.761* 0.972* 0.74 0.693 3**
ived * ** * * 0.686* * 2** * *
(0.270 (0.34 (0.270 (0.269 (0.271 (0.326 (0.2 (0.29 (0.2
) 2) ) ) ) ) 71) 0) 97)
1.21
Loss- 1.288* 1.409 1.232* 1.228* 1.170* 1.544* 4** 1.116 0.66
esR ** *** ** ** ** ** * *** 5*
(0.305 (0.38 (0.308 (0.305 (0.299 (0.355 (0.3 (0.31 (0.3
) 4) ) ) )) 06) 1) 11)
Public
licCas - - - - - - 0.82 - -
Cas- 0.851* 0.956 0.901* 0.811* 0.724* 1.030* 2** 0.707 0.46
eSR ** *** ** ** * ** * ** 3+
(0.238 (0.29 (0.249 (0.240 (0.232 (0.275 (0.2 (0.24 (0.2
3) ) ) ) ) 41) 4) 43)
0.47
Liti- 0.402* 0.401* 0.398* 0.803* 0.40 0.379 8**
gious * 0.187 * * ** 0.111 0** * *
(0.150 (0.19 (0.151 (0.149 (0.223 (0.194 (0.1 (0.15 (0.1
) 6) ) ) ) ) 49) 4) 46)
0.23
Re- 0.222* 0.255* 0.227* 0.237* 0.286* 4** 0.16form ** 0.188 ** ** ** ** * 0.102 0*
(0.064 (0.37 (0.068 (0.066 (0.065 (0.077 (0.0 (0.07 (0.0
0) ) ) ) ) 65) 0) 64)
- - - - - - 2.65 - -
AF 2.236* 1.638 2.434* 2.473* 2.411* 2.094* 6** 1.900 2.28
** * ** ** ** * * ** 8*
(0.685 (0.76 (0.692 (0.690 (0.682 (0.778 (0.7 (0.69 (1.0
) 6) ) ) ) ) 16) 7) 57)
Brib- - 1.553* - - 1.09 0.805 0.04
eryR 1.045* 0.049 * 1.099* 1.211* -0.367 0* + 1
(0.457 (0.59 (0.536 (0.457 (0.478 (0.538 (0.4 (0.47 (0.4
) 8) ) ) ) ) 60) 5) 66)
Brib- - - - - 1.44 -
eryc 1.36** - 1.590* 1.488* 1.571* 3** - 1.24
* 0.128 ** ** ** -0.595 * 0.611 6**




























































) ) ) ) 23) 0) 47)
0.30 0.01
0.185 0.228 0.202 -0.153 8* 0.068 7
(0.142 (0.139 (0.141 (0.218 (0.1 (0.14 (0.1
46) 4) 47)
0.775* 0.752* 0.765* 0.71 0.908 0.89
* * * 0.616 4** * 7**
(0.274 (0.270 (0.272 (0.438 (0.2 (0.36 (0.3
69) 4) 18)
0.03 0.00
0.040 0.040 0.043 0.076* 6 0.033 7
(0.027 (0.026 (0.027 (0.035 (0.0 (0.02 (0.0
27) 9) 28)
0.143 0.143 0.140 0.201 0.14 - 0.14
+ + + + 2+ 0.135 2*
(0.074 (0.073 (0.073 (0.113 (0.0 (0.09 (0.0
) ) 73) 8) 68)
0.19 0.11
-0.136 -0.144 -0.132 -0.122 1 0.044 9
(0.122 (0.122 (0.123 (0.168 (0.1 (0.14 (0.1
) ) 29) 3) 23)
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(0.08
7)
Inter- - - - - - 9.24 - -
cept 9.47** 8.947 8.874* 8.959* 9.390* 3** 9.110 9.71
* + ** ** ** -5.547 * ** 3**
(2.649 (4.91 (2.677 (2.632 (2.694 (4.160 (2.6 (3.28 (3.1
) 0) ) ) ) ) 35) 7) 65)
N 339 289 339 339 339 262 337 291 339
Log- - - - - - - - -
likeli- - 136.4 179.07 180.80 177.24 134.88 177. 158.6 161.
hood 179.25 93 1 8 9 7 418 06 446
0.00 0.00
Prob 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0** 0.000 0**
> chi2 ** *** ** ** ** ** * *** *
Pseu- 0.21 0.18
do R2 0.209 0.254 0.210 0.202 0.218 0.221 4 0.150 5
Note: +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Table 5: Predicting Settlement at ICSID, 1972-2012: Robustness Checks
Ar- Expe- Cor- Na-
genti- ITA x rup- Infla- tional- Rule4
Case Year na rience tion tion ity 3
LongLiv 0.776 1.199 0.763* 0.786 0.726* 1.171* 0.723 0.767
ed ** * * * ** ** 0.755* **
(0.278 (0.356 (0.278 (0.278 (0.279 (0.277
(0.279) (0.341) ) (0.303)
0.893 0.827* 0.814 0.779* 0.984* 0.812 0.830LossesR ** .696* * ** * * ** 0.624* **
(0.302 (0.353 (0.301 (0.302 (0.301 (0.300
(0.295) (0.34) ) (0.296)
Public 0.586 - - 0.542 0.546
CaseSR * -.413 0.554* -0.53* 0.485* -0.643* * -0.347 *
(0.238 (0.266 (0.240 (0.239 (0.238 (0.237
(0.233) (0.266) ) (0.233)
. 0.585 .521* 0.568* 0.567 0.799* 0.571 0.487* 0.569
Litigious *** * ** *** ** 0.425* *** *
(0.154 (0.196 (0.151 (0.152 (0.151 (0.152
(0.213) (0.191) ) (0.158)
0.112 0.117
Reform + -. 153 0.104 + 0.115+ 0.093 0.11+ 0.057 0.098
(0.061 (0.370 (0.064 (0.064 (0.061 (0.061
(0.062) (0.075) ) (0.071)
Addi- - - - -
tional 1.642 - 1.842 - - 1.912 - 1.785
Facility * -.964 1.774* * 1.799* 1.574+ * 1.613* *
(0.777 (0.870 (0.779 (0.779 (0.790 (0.777
(0.777) (0.855) ) (0.786)
BriberyR 0.142 .419 0.042 0.065 0.028 0.542 0.064 0.064 0.091
(0.609 (0.479 (0.442 (0.440
(0.44) ) ) (0.44) (0.450) (0.542) ) (0.474)
Briberyc 1.031 1.109* 1.156 1.156* 1.072 1.093
* -.417 * ** * 0.141 ** -0.386 **
(0.412 (0.728 (0.416 (0.417 (0.414 (0.411
(0.418) (0.601) ) (0.493)
Against Secrecy
GDPR
(Log) 0.092 -.145 0.084 0.097
(0.141 (0.201 (0.142 (0.141
) ) ) )
GDPc 0.513
(Log) 0.54* .516 0.514* *
(0.255 (0.359 (0.254 (0.256
) ) ) )
PolitYR -0.017 .001 -0.014 -0.015
(0.027 (0.035 (0.027 (0.027
) ) ) )
Polityc 
-0.094 -. 170 -0.093 -0.092
(0.059 (0.110 (0.059 (0.059
) ) ) )
FDIR
(Log) -0.114 -.007 -0.109 -0.115
(0.118 (0.183 (0.118 (0.118





0.076 -0.238 0.144 -0.026 0.089
(0.146 (0.140
(0.142) (0.224) ) (0.149)
0.494 0.514
0.521* 0.608 + 0.356 *
(0.254 (0.254
(0.256) (0.416) ) (0.335)
-0.013 0.016 -0.015 -0.006 -0.013
(0.027 (0.027
(0.027) (0.035) ) (0.030)
-0.09 -0.244* -0.091 0.021 -0.094
(0.058 (0.059
(0.059) (0.100) ) (0.085)
-0.106 -0.097 -0.127 -0.077 -0.109
(0.121 (0.118
























Intercept 7.351 - 6.512 6.731* 6.744 6.467
** -2.127 6.430* * * -4.78 ** -4.774 *
(2.627 (4.777 (2.583 (2.586 (2.586 (2.576
(2.617) (4.034) ) (3.183)
N 339 286 339 339 339 262 337 291 339
Log like- 174.5 132.9 177.02 176.5 175.59 129.37 175.1 151.02 177.0
lihood 60 13 8 05 8 2 21 1 62
Prob > 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000
chi2 0*** 0*** ** 0*** ** ** 0*** ** 0***
Pseudo
R2 0.183 0.232 0.171 0.174 0.178 0.198 0.174 0.136 0.171
Note: +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.O1, ***p<.001
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